Annoncer: This is The Takeaway with Melissa Harris-Perry from WNYC and PRX in collaboration with WGBH Radio in Boston.
Melissa Harris-Perry: On December 8th, 2021, president Biden assured the public there would be no American ground forces fighting in Ukraine.
President Biden: We have a moral obligation and a legal obligation on our NATO allies. If they were to attack under Article 5, it's a sacred obligation. That obligation does not extend to NATO coming to Ukraine
Melissa Harris-Perry: On January 25th, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki re-emphasized the point.
Jen Psaki: Just to be clear, there was no intention or interest, or desire by the president to send troops to Ukraine.
Melissa Harris-Perry: On February 2nd, president Biden did approve deployment of 3,000 troops to Eastern Europe, but Pentagon press secretary, John Kirby, reiterated.
John Kirby: These forces are not going to fight in Ukraine.
Melissa Harris-Perry: On Monday, the Kremlin ordered Russian forces into Ukraine and despite repeated efforts to reach a diplomatic solution, tensions are rising rather than settling. The Biden administration has been consistent for months. American troops will not fight in Ukraine. Just what does the world plant do as Russia stands ready to invade a sovereign nation.
President Biden: I'm announcing the first tranche of sanctions to impose costs on Russia in response to their actions yesterday. These have been closely coordinated with our allies and partners and we'll continue to escalate sanctions of Russia escalates.
Melissa Harris-Perry: With me is Jacob Kirkegaard who is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and German Marshall Fund. Jacob, welcome to The Takeaway.
Jacob Kirkegaard: My pleasure.
Melissa Harris-Perry: Sanctions seem to be the primary tool that we have at our disposal. What is the history of the efficacy of sanctions?
Jacob Kirkegaard: I think when it comes to deterring a major economy and military power like Russia from doing something that its leadership wants to do, that track record is very poor. Typically, economic sanctions is something that may have an effect on smaller economies. It tends to work only in the medium to long run, and if it's to have any real effect, they need to be global in scope in the sense that they will typically have to be enforced or imposed by the UN security council, not just United States with its key European allies.
Melissa Harris-Perry: Now, in 2014, that's exactly the group, the US and our allies imposed sanctions on Russia during the annexation of Crimea. When we look at that moment in 2014, can we say, well, they were effective there because he did not in fact invade Eastern Ukraine?
Jacob Kirkegaard: No, I think the lesson from 2014 is that sanctions against Russia have had very little effect on deterring the actions of Vladimir Putin. Yes, the sanctions then did target some of his inner circles, some of the Russian banks. Yes, they did lower overall trade, particularly between Russia and the EU. It's clear that the co-dependence between certainly many members of the EU and Russia when it comes to natural gas, but also, the role of Russia as one of the largest oil producers in the world on the global oil markets.
That energy was not included in the sanctions in 2014. They haven't been so far this time either. Unless that happens, you are not going to have a major immediate impact on the Russian economy. Of course, if we choose to do that, you would certainly see energy prices rise much further in the EU and quite likely also see a further upward hike on gas prices in the United States.
Melissa Harris-Perry: Jacob, you were making this point before the break about the likelihood that the most effective sanctions would also create potentially higher prices at the gas pump for Americans going into a midterm election season. I'm wondering, is there any possibility that those more effective sanctions would be put into place given that very real not only economic but political reality that the Biden administration would face?
Jacob Kirkegaard: No, I think unfortunately the reality is that the energy sector is probably not going to be included in those sanctions. There are also other types of sanctions that the US government has at its disposal that could be maybe not in the immediate, but certainly in the medium term be quite potentially painful for the Russian economy. One of them is export controls. There, US government has the ability to deny Russian access to technology in the IT sector, high tech, et cetera, chips, and the light.
That's what was used against some of the Chinese companies like Huawei earlier, and that would I think have an effect. You could also completely block out the Russian financial sector, Russian individuals from the global financial system by denying it access to the swift network of money transactions, et cetera. Again, the Russian economy today is probably more resilient against certainly financial sanctions than it were in 2014. Again, I would be skeptical that these would seriously deter Vladimir Putin's course of action in the Ukraine.
Melissa Harris-Perry: Could sanctions hurt or harm the Russian people and their lived experience on a day-to-day basis though?
Jacob Kirkegaard: Well, there's always this trade-off or internal conflict when you impose a wide range of economic sanctions on a country or a government because, typically, you do it against dictatorships like Russia right now. That means that it's often the case that you or us as the international community or the west, if you like, probably care more about the economic circumstances and welfare of the average Russian than arguably the Russian government itself.
Because I don't think there's any doubt that if you were to impose further wide-ranging economic sanctions on Russia, it would have potentially significant negative effects also on the average living standards of Russians. Of course, given the authoritarian nature of the Russian government, these Russian citizens wouldn't have the capacity to make their displeasure known through any elector or meaningful electoral process. There's always a trade-off between the welfare of the average person and your desire to affect the actions of a government.
Melissa Harris-Perry: That's exactly the asymmetry that Putin understands that President Biden is facing is that president Biden is, in fact, beholden to US public opinion through elections, not only for himself but for his party in the midterm elections, whereas as you point out that is not the circumstance that Vladimir Putin is facing as he leads Russia. If troops are truly off the table and sanctions seem unlikely to shift the balance of calculation for Vladimir Putin in the short term. Are there any effective tools left in our toolbox for stopping this invasion?
Jacob Kirkegaard: I'm not sure that there is any effective tools. If Russia or Vladimir Putin has decided to attack Ukraine, he's probably going to do it. Certainly, it is within our capacity to affect that calculation, not necessarily by economic sanctions, but by arming and preparing Ukraine because Ukraine is a large country. It has a really large and battle heartened army. Even if the Russian forces are undoubtedly better equipped and more numerous, this isn't going to be a walk in the park.
Melissa Harris-Perry: Jacob Kirkegaard, thank you very much for taking the time to speak with us today.
Jacob Kirkegaard: My pleasure.
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