Brian Lehrer: It's The Brian Lehrer Show on WNYC. Good morning, again, everyone. We've been talking on the show about the resounding defeat yesterday of that anti-referendum referendum in Ohio, an apparent big win for abortion rights without the word abortion being on the ballot, and a win for direct democracy; policy made by the people, not gerrymandered legislatures. We're going to get a legal take on this now, how it fits into our democracy according to a legal scholar, and also look at the latest developments in the prosecution of the alleged plot to destroy electoral democracy by Donald Trump.

Our guest this round is Kate Shaw, law professor at the Cardozo Law School and ABC News Supreme Court contributor and co-host of the legal affairs podcast Strict Scrutiny. She also had an op-ed in The New York Times published Monday called, "One of the most brazen Republican schemes around abortion is happening in Ohio." Kate, always good to have you on. Welcome back to WNYC.

Kate Shaw: Brian, thanks so much for having me.

Brian Lehrer: Let's start with your take on the Ohio vote. Voters in that increasingly Republican state, for those who haven't heard the news, rejected the Republicans' attempt to make it harder to pass ballot measures. That was aimed at a ballot measure that they'll be voting on in November for abortion rights. What does it mean for abortion rights as you see it, and what does it mean for the nature of American law?

Kate Shaw: Obviously, this is a really important outcome for the State of Ohio and the future of abortion rights and abortion access in Ohio, but it obviously has national resonance as well. As you said, this was a referendum not squarely about abortion. It was about making it harder to amend the Ohio Constitution, but the Legislature in Ohio called this special election in order to raise the threshold for amending the Constitution almost certainly because there was an effort underway that has now proven successful to get an abortion question on the November ballot.

Definitely, Ohioans are going to go to the ballot in November to decide whether to amend the Ohio Constitution to protect abortion. The only question was whether only a simple majority of voters would be required to do that as has been the case under Ohio law since 1912, or whether this new requirement would be successful on the ballot yesterday, which would have raised the threshold to 60%, making it much harder to amend the Ohio Constitution. That would have applied across the board but its most immediate impact would be felt in how difficult it would be to amend the Constitution to protect abortion rights.

This means I think there's a very good chance, and I wouldn't call it certain, but very likely that after November, there will be constitutional protection in Ohio for abortion rights. That's really important in this once bellwether now pretty conservative red state of Ohio, but I think it also tells us something about the politics following Dobbs, which overturned Roe versus Wade last summer. The Supreme Court in that opinion said, "Abortion is a question that should be left to the democratic process, not to the courts. Let's let the people decide state by state whether to protect abortion, restrict it, prohibit it outright."

In the year plus since Dobbs, we've seen a lot of legislative activity on abortion, some to protect abortion, some to restrict abortion, but direct democracy has been really interesting because every time people in states that have direct democracy have gone to the ballots, they voted to protect abortion, either to enshrine protections in the Constitution or to fight back efforts to restrict abortion. First and most significantly, I think in Kansas, a pretty red state where an effort to restrict abortion rights failed spectacularly just a couple of months after Dobbs. This is a trend, I think, that is now unmistakable that when Americans vote directly on abortion after Dobbs, they vote to protect it.

Brian Lehrer: For you as a Supreme Court watcher in your New York Times op-ed, you wrote, "The episode should serve as a reminder that despite the Supreme Court's claim that Dobbs merely returned the question of abortion to the states, for opponents of abortion, allowing the residents of each state to decide this issue for themselves was never the goal, at least not in the long-term. Instead, the long-term goal is to prohibit abortion as widely and as completely as possible," so I think that's an indisputable fact, but do you think that's what the Supreme Court justices had in mind, or do you at least give them credit for grappling honesty with a constitutional question, that is whether anything in the Constitution could be interpreted as relevant to abortion rights one way or the other?

Kate Shaw: I'm not sure that the answer is the same. You had five justices who voted to overturn Roe in the Dobbs case, you had a sixth justice, John Roberts, who wouldn't have overturned Roe but who agreed that Mississippi should be able to enforce its 15-week abortion ban. You had six justices basically argue that the Constitution either definitely doesn't or maybe doesn't protect the right to abortion, but that the state should just decide for themselves.

I'm not sure each of those justices actually thinks in the same way about what the Constitution really has to say here. I think for some of them-- Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion that really did seem to say let the people decide. Democracy should be the name of the game when we're talking about a question that is as fraught and divisive as abortion, but I think that for many of the other conservative justices, democracy, I think, was invoked in an instrumental and convenient fashion in the opinion.

Returning the question to the states was an argument that had been made against abortion rights, against Roe, not actually really immediately following Roe. When Roe was first decided in 1973 it actually wasn't terribly controversial but quickly became very controversial. The initial post-Roe response was, well, we have to amend the Constitution to protect human life, to protect the unborn, not just overturning Roe and returning the question to the states, but prohibiting abortion nationwide. That proved quickly politically unpalatable to many Americans.

Actually, social movements' strategy changed, and so did some of the legal arguments against Roe as the 1970s and 1980s proceeded. I think both a lot of legal conservatives, and a lot of movement activists came to rest on this position that we're not trying to ban abortion nationwide, we're just trying to return the question to the states. That was a strategic decision that was made, but I'm not convinced that that actually-- in fact, I'm quite convinced that that is not actually the preferred outcome for many, many anti-abortion activists for obvious reasons.

If you genuinely believe that abortion is tantamount to ending a life, then it can't possibly be tolerable to just let states decide whether to adopt a policy that permits that. I actually think that a lot of these arguments grounded in democracy are strategic and instrumental, but not actually good faith. I think that Dobbs rested on democracy largely because that felt like a palatable place to land, but for some of the justices in the majority, and I think for many anti-abortion activists and believers, that's actually a waystation en route to a final destination, which is actually a nationwide prohibition, and whether that takes the form of a statute passed by Congress, signed by the president that prohibits abortion nationwide, or whether it takes the form of a Supreme Court opinion that finds either based on the due process clause or equal protection principles that the unborn have a right to life, either way, that that's actually the ultimate goal.

That again, I'm not sure which of the Supreme Court's conservative justices are fully committed to that outcome, but I do believe that for some of them, and probably for Justice Alito who wrote the opinion in Dobbs, that actually is the final objective. These efforts to actually restrict access to direct democracy in the wake of Dobbs, I think, make good sense from that perspective. Democracy really actually wasn't ever the ultimate goal.

Brian Lehrer: Yes. I always thought that saying they wanted the issue returned to the states was a misdirection because they could say that since the Supreme Court's Roe decision was stopping a state from enforcing an abortion restriction, but it was just to return it to the political sector generally. That could include the states, but that also could include some kind of national ban if they were able to effect that in Congress. There's a difference between returning it to the states and returning it to the political debate, the political sector that's meaningful.

In that context, Kate, is it possible that what's happening now as a result of Dobbs could ultimately lead to a more secure abortion rights future in the US? It's certainly not in the short run with all these emboldened Republican legislators, but if the anti-abortion movement doesn't have a right created by the Supreme Court to kick around anymore, these wins in the political system might be seen as more definitive or might just become entrenched as more definitive, and the movement against women's rights in this respect will be diminished.

Kate Shaw: I think it's complicated, Brian, because direct democracy, as we've just been talking about, has been very successful in protecting abortion rights and abortion access, but not every state has a robust direct democracy mechanism. Really only about half of American states even have procedures by which you can put a substantive question like, is there a right to bodily autonomy, or to choose to continue or terminate a pregnancy on the ballot so that people can vote outright?

I think that in the states where that's possible, and where legislators are not successful in throttling the ability of the people to go to the polls and express their views outright, then I do think that it's possible that abortion rights will be enshrined in a durable way but it's not really a nationwide solution because, in many states, there just isn't access to direct democracy or legislatures are impeding the ability of direct democracy to function.

If we're looking to what could be a durable national solution, I do think that Congress passing a law, and presumably, a Democratic president signing a law that enshrined some protections for abortion access would be a nationwide solution. Would it be a durable one that would lay to rest political controversy? No, I don't think so, and I don't know whether this Supreme Court would uphold a law like that or whether that would just be a way for the Supreme Court to either the Supreme Court could find that Congress lacks the power under the Commerce clause or under other constitutional sources of authority to even pass a nationwide abortion protection law. Or if the Supreme Court did take that significant next step and find that the Constitution protects a right to life for the unborn, then of course a federal law protecting abortion would be deemed unconstitutional.

I'm not sure apart from overturning Dobbs and understanding, again, I think in a different and probably better-grounded way that the Constitution's protections do encompass the liberty to choose whether to remain pregnant or to terminate a pregnancy, that I think actually probably is the most durable long-term way to protect abortion but I think it's a long path given the Supreme Court and the federal courts in general from here to there, and the premise of your question, would that actually resolve political controversy? Not necessarily, but I'm not sure any of these other paths would either.

Brian Lehrer: I see you also had an op-ed in The Times recently supporting revival of the ERA, the Equal Rights Amendment, which came up again in the Senate recently. You wrote that the ERA properly applied would guard against pregnancy and motherhood discrimination and protect women's control over their reproductive lives. Do you think that amendment to the Constitution would be interpreted in part as an abortion rights provision of the Constitution without saying abortion explicitly, just saying equal rights for women?

Kate Shaw: Thank you for bringing that up, Brian. I do think that the ERA is this amendment that was basically dormant in the States until-- It was racing toward ratification in the 1970s. It would've essentially just guaranteed sex equality under the Constitution, and that's a guarantee that's been read into the 14th Amendment, but this would be an explicit guarantee of sex equality. It looked like it was going to be ratified in the 1970s and then in the early 1980s, and then ratification efforts just ground to a halt. Then actually, the early years of the Donald Trump administration renewed interest in reviving the Equal Rights Amendment.

35 states had ratified the ERA by 1982, and then with this revival, the three additional states that have brought us to 38 states which is the constitutionally required number of states to ratify a constitutional amendment, actually ratified. In 2020, we had the 38th state ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. Sorry for the long windup, but just in case people haven't been following where exactly we are. At the moment, there is an argument that the ERA is actually already part of the Constitution in that it has satisfied the constitutional requirements for getting an amendment into the Constitution.

The problem is that when Congress introduced the Equal Rights Amendment, it included a deadline and the deadline had long since passed for ratification by the time these three most recent states ratified. There's an open question about what actually the status of the ERA is but were we to get to a point where it was understood as included in the Constitution as the 28th Amendment to the Constitution, there would be an interpretive question of whether it protected abortion rights. I think that properly understood, it would protect a right to an abortion.

Another path, I guess back to your last question about durable solutions, if we were to ratify and accept as ratified the Equal Rights Amendment and the Supreme Court were to find that that new constitutional guarantee did supply the basis for a right to terminate a pregnancy, that I think would be durable, but of course, again, interpretive questions under our scheme go back to the Supreme Court and it is entirely possible that this Supreme Court, which I think is quite hostile to abortion rights, would find a way to reach the conclusion that the Equal Rights Amendment guaranteed some kinds of sex equality, prohibited employment discrimination, and maybe pregnancy discrimination maybe, but not a right to abortion in part because in the eyes of the Supreme Court, abortion is different from other kinds of rights in that there is another potential life in the mix.

I do think the court would have to grapple seriously with the argument that the ERA protected a right to abortion in a way it really didn't grapple seriously with equality-based arguments in Dobbs. It basically had two sentences saying it was very critical of Roe, which had really grounded the right to abortion in privacy, not equality. Then Dobbs acknowledged, well, in the intervening years, there have been arguments that equal protection guarantees are a basis for the abortion right even if these more amorphous notions of privacy and liberty are not.

It spent a couple of sentences saying, well, we have earlier cases finding that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination and so that argument is foreclosed by our precedents. Well, the court couldn't say that if there were a new amendment in the Constitution. I do think that that would be another viable path, though again, I think it would be a mistake to put too much talk in the Supreme Court robustly reading the guarantees of a new Equal Rights Amendment were it actually added to the Constitution.

Brian Lehrer: Listeners, we can take your calls and texts, and tweets for Cardozo Law professor and ABC Supreme Court contributor, Kate Shaw. 212-433-WNYC, 212-433-9692. Call or text or tweet @BrianLehrer on what we've been discussing so far, the result in Ohio yesterday, and the implications both for abortion rights and for democracy and the law, the Equal Rights Amendment and the attempt to revive it, and the implications of that which Kate also wrote about in a New York Times op-ed.

We're going to get into the Trump indictments in a couple of minutes, the protective order battle that's going on right now, and we'll be in court again on Friday, and the larger meaning, not so much of the New York indictment or even the classified documents indictment, but of this particular Jack Smith indictment from last week on an attempt to disenfranchise voters, that's actually in the indictment, and to defraud the American people with the ways that Trump tried to flip the election. We'll get into some of that. 212-433-WNYC, 212-433-9692. You can also text to that number or tweet @BrianLehrer.

I just want to follow up on something you said about the assumption in any abortion rights debate about the other interested party. Because the legal argument on the other side includes the idea that abortion is not just a question of women's rights because there is another person with a competing human rights interest, the fetus, which they consider a person with its right not to be killed. They'd say that makes this different from, say, an employer refusing to hire a woman based on her being a woman. How would you as a lawyer counter that?

Kate Shaw: I think that what the Supreme Court basically said in Roe was we're not equipped to answer the fundamentally philosophical, maybe metaphysical question of when life begins, but we do know that there is a subject who is a rights-bearing subject, which is the pregnant person, and so that's the person whom the law and the Constitution protects. It would require us to accept a deeply contested proposition that a pregnancy is also a person or a fetus is also a person and that's not something that we have the power to do.

I think that one doesn't need to refute absolutely the claim, I think, nor are lawyers or judges really equipped to do it, but those seeking to imbue a fetus with rights are the ones I think who would have to ask judges and lawyers, again, to accept a proposition that they just don't have the qualifications or role in our system to accept. What the law does is it protects what is clearly a rights-bearing entity, a pregnant person. What I think Dobbs seems to do is basically to say that that person who is undeniably a legal person, the person who is pregnant, actually does not have rights, at least vis-a-vis this condition of that person's body for the duration of a pregnancy, basically from the time of conception, and that seems to me a deeply wrong proposition of law.

Even if there can be deep and good faith disputes about the kind of status of the unborn person as many abortion opponents would understand a fetus to be, but I think what isn't in doubt is that a woman is rights-bearing. I think what's also not in doubt is that what Dobbs basically says is that, at least in this one sphere, that person has no rights that need to be recognized, and that, I think, is irreconcilable with our basic constitutional guarantees.

Brian Lehrer: By the way, do you have a take on what the Ohio Abortion Rights Referendum, if it passes in November, would actually guarantee the first line of that, which has been the subject of a lot of right versus left debate, says basically that an individual has a right to control their own reproductive lives in a very broad way that the right is saying would also give people a right to gender-affirming care if they want to transition, and also, that it removes the rights of parents because there's no specific guarantee that a parent would have a say over a minor's abortion, it just says an individual has a right to control their reproductive life. Do you have any legal take on what that amendment to the Ohio Constitution, if it passes in November, would actually do in those respects or how it might be fought in court?

Kate Shaw: I think that a lot of that would be to be determined through litigation by the Ohio courts. I will say that it's a pretty common anti-abortion strategy to invoke children as a wedge to defeat broader access to reproductive rights. These initial efforts to prohibit interstate travel for abortion care are initially targeting interstate travel by children or facilitating interstate travel for underaged individuals to access abortions, I think as a first step to desensitize the population because even people with conflicting intuitions about abortion may be sympathetic to the argument that children should not cross state lines to obtain abortions.

If those laws go into effect and are enforced, then that paves the way to prohibitions on adult travel to obtain abortions. I just think that that's a well-worn, page out of an anti-abortion playbook to begin by targeting children and focusing on parental rights and then using that as a wedge to actually erode rights more broadly, so this feels familiar.

I also think that as to gender-affirming care for children and things like that, parental rights are separately protected in every state's constitution. There would need to be an effort by courts to reconcile the rights guaranteed by this new abortion amendment, if it does pass in November as it seems very likely that it will, with existing parental protections to control their children's lives and education and medical care as part of a bundle of rights that parents possess.

There's nothing in this proposed constitutional amendment that would broadly erase parental rights as they exist under Ohio law and every other state's law, and so that feels to me like a set of purely political arguments that are being deployed now to erode support for this amendment, but that very much overstate the radical effect that this amendment, if added to the Ohio Constitution, would in fact have.

Brian Lehrer: Jean in Brooklyn, you're on WNYC with Cardozo Law Professor, Kate Shaw. Hi Jean.

Jean: Hi. I was calling in to ask the Professor's opinion on the lawsuits there. I think they're about 15 lawsuits now in eight different states by religious groups that are arguing that their religious freedom is violated by the anti-abortion laws that are being passed. Their own views, from their religious points of view, on the rights of a woman to survive and when a fetus is a human being, are different from the Catholic churches and the evangelicals.

Kate Shaw: [crosstalk] Yes, it's a great question, Jean.

Brian Lehrer: Go ahead, Kate.

Kate Shaw: Sure. Brian, you posed a very similar question, I think the last time we spoke about this topic.

Brian Lehrer: This is my favorite question on abortion rights in court. The right is so dedicated to religious liberty. You have major denominations in this country. I've said before, I grew up in Reform Judaism, the biggest branch of Judaism in the United States, and their position is pro-choice. Why isn't it a violation of the First Amendment in the religious liberty sense to tell reform Jews that they can't get abortions?

Kate Shaw: Right, and a lot of people's telling Reform Judaism, it's not just like a general pro-choice position, but actually a sense of a faith-based obligation to actually support the termination of a pregnancy where it would imperil the life of a pregnant person in both view of the pregnant person's control over their destiny on autonomy, in view of their need to care for existing children.

We know based on data that most abortions in this country are secured and accessed both before and since Dobbs by women who already have existing children that they are seeking to care for, and so there are pressing needs, sometimes actually theologically grounded, to terminate a pregnancy, and yet you would never from reading Dobbs, which is not on its face, a religious, opinion says nothing explicitly that is bound up in faith, and yet subtextually, it feels like there is an acceptance of a general view that religious conviction flows in one direction on the issue of abortion and that is just factually false.

I don't know. I think that, honestly, this Supreme Court, if it were deciding this case, a case that actually asserted a religiously grounded right to access an abortion, would have to, if it was consistently applying its religious liberty jurisprudence, credit those representations and actually allow an exception from an abortion prohibition or restriction. Yet the way I would imagine the court would dispose of a case like that, given its deep hostility I think to abortion broadly, is that it might allow or require some as-applied exceptions, which is to say that states would have to create mechanisms for individuals to basically assert that they have a religiously grounded need to obtain an abortion and thus should get a hall pass to get an abortion for individuals who can make that kind of showing as opposed to broadly invalidating these abortion restrictions or prohibitions.

I think that those are important lawsuits, and I think that they should succeed on this court's own religious liberty jurisprudence, but I'm not sure that they're likely to lead to rulings that invalidate abortion laws on a broader scale.

Brian Lehrer: We'll continue in a minute with Kate Shaw from the Cardozo Law School and the Strict Scrutiny legal affairs podcast, and turn the page and get to this Trump-in-court news. Stay with us.

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Brian Lehrer: Brian Lehrer on WNYC with Kate Shaw, law professor at Cardozo Law School, an ABC News Supreme Court contributor, and co-host of the Legal Affairs podcast, Strict Scrutiny. All right. Let's go on to the next battle in the legal system of the nature of American democracy, the prosecution of Donald Trump for allegedly attempting to defraud the United States and disenfranchise voters with his schemes to flip his election defeat. The immediate battle is over the scope of what's known as a protective order regarding things Trump can or cannot say in public. Can you explain to our listeners exactly what a protective order is as that's going to be back in court on Friday?

Kate Shaw: Sure thing. It's just an order that places limits on basically how information that gets exchanged as part of legal proceedings can be used. They're very standard. When the prosecution, once there's been an indictment, the prosecution turns over a lot of information to the defendant in order to enable the defendant to prepare a robust defense. Oftentimes, within that discovery that the prosecution hands over to the defense, there's information that is sensitive, and so the prosecution will seek a protective order that places limits on what the defense team can do with that information.

Typically just can't publicly disseminate it if there are grand jury transcripts in the discovery or there's identifying information about witnesses and things of that nature. Typically, defense counsel will just agree to that protective order. Sometimes there's some negotiation or discussion about what the protective order scope will be, but again, they're pretty routine documents. Yet it is already turning out to be in anything but routine proceeding, particularly in the January 6th prosecution.

Actually, there are already protective orders in effect in the Mar-a-Lago documents case, that's the other federal case that Trump is facing, and in the New York Stormy Daniels hush money business records case. It is not as though former President Trump's legal team has never agreed to a protective order, but they are very much resisting the proposals that special or the prosecutor Jack Smith's team has proposed in two separate proposals with respect to the January 6th discovery. There's going to be a hearing this Friday before Judge Chutkan in the District of Columbia essentially to hash out the contours of a protective order, but I presume one will be entered either Friday or shortly thereafter.

Brian Lehrer: Have you as a lawyer or a legal scholar ever seen a case where a defendant seems to implicitly threaten the prosecutors, future juries, the judge by saying, "If you go after me, I'm coming after you," as Trump posted the other day?

Kate Shaw: I never have, and I don't think there's ever been a defendant quite like Donald Trump in this case, this was really wild. On Friday, I think it was, this was a social media post in all caps that you just quoted, Brian. It's not even such a veiled threat. That feels like a pretty explicit threat. That excerpt went right into the filings that special counsel Jack Smith's team produced for the district court, basically as an example of why it was so important. Basically, what the special counsel's team is asking for is an order that prevents Trump from disclosing any evidence that he gets from the prosecution publicly at all.

They basically say there are already these threatening social media posts, like the one you just read, and the discovery is going to include things like grand jury testimony and witness interviews and information regarding surveillance and things like that, and it's really, really important that he be prohibited from disseminating that information. It could endanger specific individuals, it could get really specific. Now, these are generalized threats, but if he is able to take that information and incorporate it into his public relations campaign, the stakes could be really high, and people could be in genuine danger.

That's essentially the case that Smith's team is making, they're basically saying, we want to turn this information over, and we want to turn it over quickly because we want to move things along. They very much want a trial date to be set and they want it to be set soon, and in order to do that, they need to give the defendant the information that the Constitution requires to get access to, to prepare a defense, but they don't want to do that in a way that's going to jeopardize witnesses, individuals, personnel, and so that's their goal in seeking this protective order.

What Trump's team is basically saying is a protective order along the lines that Smith is asking for will violate his free speech rights. They want him to be able to speak publicly about these proceedings, maybe even about the contents of the discovery, and they say that maybe we'll agree to something more narrow that just encompasses things like Grand Jury transcripts, but we can agree to essentially a prohibition on him talking broadly about the case, certainly, but even particular elements of the evidence. It's hard for me to see the judge being very receptive to those arguments, but we will see on Friday.

Brian Lehrer: Well, the Trump argument is that this is political speech. Even that post, which seems so threatening, was political speech aimed at Trump's political opponents in the context of him running for the presidency again. Being the leading Republican candidate at this time, not the individuals working in the legal system, or witnesses before the grand jury. In fact, the right to try to use the levers of our political system seems to be at the heart of Trump's defense in the case overall. Here's a clip of something he said recently.

Donald Trump: It is an outrageous criminalization of political speech. They're trying to make it illegal to question the results of an election?

Brian Lehrer: That's on January 6th, or I should say the whole post-election period after the 2020 election. Generally, Trump and his lawyers had been saying he may have lost in his effort to get state legislatures to reject the certified votes in their state, and he may have lost in his effort to convince Mike Pence that he had the power to reject the Biden vote from selected states, but those efforts were just failed attempts to win at politics, not crimes. How do you think a prosecutor will respond to that?

Kate Shaw: Well, I think there's already some pre-emptive responses to it in the indictment itself. Page 2 of the indictment goes out of its way, bends over backward to say the defendant had a right to speak about the election, he had a right to lie about the election, he had a right to lie to say that there had been outcome determinative fraud.

Honestly, none of the statements like the statements on the ellipse, if you don't fight like hell, you won't have a country, that was at the core of the second Trump impeachment. That's not even really part of these charges. The charges are much more focused on trying to obstruct the governmental proceeding of the opening and counting of the ballots on January 6th. The actual effort to deprive individual voters of their right to vote by seeking to fraudulently substitute electors who did not reflect the votes of individuals in states.

I think the prosecution itself is trying very hard to target conduct that was clearly fraudulent and obstructive and to stay very far away from seeking to punish speech. Yet there is this effort to essentially collapse the distinction that I think the Trump team is already making in the public sphere, and they're very likely to mount as a defense in court and I think the two are just different. I don't think that what Smith's team is doing here is trying to criminalize speech, but I expect us to hear that again and again from Trump, again, both publicly and in court.

Brian Lehrer: Kate Shaw, law professor at Cardozo Law School and ABC News Supreme Court contributor, and co-host of the legal affairs podcast, Strict Scrutiny. Kate, thanks so much for all of this. Thanks a lot.

Kate Shaw: Thank you for having me, Brian.

Brian Lehrer: Brian Lehrer on WNYC and stay tuned for All Of It.

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