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Brian Lehrer: We're on WNYC where we just talked to US under secretary of State, Derek Chollet. With me now, Washington Post, Pentagon, and national security correspondent, Karoun Demirjian. Among her latest articles, Pentagon rules out sending warplanes to Ukraine says benefit would be low. Thanks for coming on, Karoun when you're covering these fast-moving events from so many angles. We appreciate your time this morning. Welcome back to WNYC.

Karoun Demirjian: Good to be with you.

Brian: You heard the state department official there. Anything jump out for you, or how would you describe the tension surrounding US diplomacy now?

Karoun Demirjian: It's interesting that we're in a moment basically, where the punitive actions against Russia have to accelerate because Russia's actions in the ground are intensifying. As you pointed out, the negotiations right now are in Ukraine's hands, and yet, you can't argue with the fact that the United States NATO have a lot of influence over the climate in which those negotiations are happening. It is ultimately between Ukraine and Russia to make the final call about what they will accept.

I do think that the author that you were citing though, the general point that they're making is when you have to take into consideration as much as president Biden is saying Putin really has to meet consequences here for his actions, he also can't really walk away from it with his head held up at home without claiming some sort of a win. Now, granted, the more punitive actions you put on Russia, the more you can take away, but taking away something that we have imposed within the last two weeks, I don't know if that's going to count as a win in Vladimir Putin's head.

These are all different elements that are maybe not exclusively controlled by the two sides of the negotiation table, but very relevant to the discussions they're having.

Brian: You reported earlier this week on the actual peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, that yielded little. Do you know what kinds of proposals were on the table and if they were anything like the Fred Kaplan blueprint?

Karoun Demirjian: These are the questions, exactly what the Ukrainians are going to be willing to accept in terms of turning the de facto status of what's going on on the ground into actual legally recognized giving up of territory. Again, Ukrainians are not really in a position where they're prepared to do that for nothing. I think you have to remember that the memory of what happened add 20 years after signing the Budapest Memorandum in Ukraine is very, very strong.

They made what seemed like a principled agreement to give up their nuclear weapons and to have these security guarantees, not defensive alliance, mutual defense pact guarantees but some security guarantees from the United States and Britain and from Russia. Yet, it didn't really do much for them 20 years later when the seizure of Crimea happened, and we saw the first war of the Donbas had to take place in 2014, '15. I don't think you're going to see Ukrainians take the first step here unless they're sure there's going to be some sort of handshake to be met by the Russians that really is durable.

Brian: Listeners, what do you want the US to do to support Ukraine against the Russian invasion, 212-433-WNYC, or what questions do you have for Washington Post's Pentagon and national security correspondent, Karoun Demirjian, 212-433-WNYC, 212-433-9692. Your article from Monday, while some calls are coming in, seemingly stuck Russian convoy hides mysteries. That's the 40-mile long line of Russian tanks that when the news of them first broke in the United States, I'm sure most people hearing the news assumed, "Oh, they will overtake the capital and the Ukrainian government by the sheer size of that force in days, a 40-mile Russian tank convoy." Why is it stuck?

Karoun Demirjian: For a number of reasons, frankly. Some of them are a credit to the Ukrainians, and some of them are self-inflicted wounds by the Russians. I think it's pretty clear now that the Russian side thought that they were going to come in a lot faster, a lot harder, and that Ukraine would fall over and that their role into Kyiv would be a lot faster than that it's proven to be. Ukrainians have been taking out parts of this convoy, targeting soft targets, and that has done damage because the Russians were not really prepared for a long haul.

They've had a lot of logistical supply issues. They've had food shortages, fuel shortages, ammunition, there's been a question about whether they've got enough of that coming in, although their stockpiles in writ large for the country are fairly large. On top of that, whether the vehicles were completely in ship shape for doing any sort of extensive maneuvers that would require you to put out more effort to take major cities. This convoy has been on the roads, not really in the forest, because of various concerns about whether those vehicles can operate in the off-road areas.

A combination of that has meant that it's stalled. There has been movement in the convoy but the march towards Kyiv has been very, very slow. I think the latest estimates from the Pentagon is that the push into the city is still 15 kilometers outside the city center. That's the city center, here is the big city, so that's getting closer but it's inching, not plowing in the way I'm sure the Russian leader expected that it would or hoped that it would.

Brian: Do the experts you talk to think it's just a matter of time before Russia takes control of the Ukrainian capital and government?

Karoun Demirjian: Look, I think that everybody that I talk to has been really impressed by the fight that the Ukrainians have put up, but I haven't yet talked to anybody who has said, "This has completely shifted the momentum, and now it's just a question of when Ukrainians might win." They are still outgunned, they are still out-positioned. What do I mean when I say that? I mean that there's a big discussion in this country and in the whole West, frankly, about whether we should be sending fighter planes and other things like that to Ukraine.

They're not using everything they have right now because the Russians have the whole territory of Ukraine, frankly, fairly well blanketed with an umbrella of target areas, surface to air missile systems, and various other sorts of munitions that they can shoot planes down out of the sky. If you can't fly things over, things like the convoy and take out targets that way, it becomes harder and slower to do it from the ground.

The Russians, they have not deployed more people to the theatre than those they pre-staged before this invasion started, but they have more people, they have more stuff, they have more that they can wheel in and cart in if they want to. The Ukrainians, we are sending them munitions, we're sending them arms, we're sending them weapons, but there's a limit to what NATO is willing to do because the West is so concerned about spillover.

Because of all those elements, I know this is a long answer to your question, but because of all those elements, that's why I don't think we've seen anybody say, "Oh, the Ukrainians could win this." I think people still think that the Russians have the upper hand and the Ukrainians have been dragging them out and tiring them out. I think the hope is that there is some sort of a way to get to an agreement before the government's decapitated in Kyiv.

Brian: You mentioned the historical context of the Budapest Memorandum and why Ukrainians are disappointed in the United States with respect to that. We have a caller on that point, Dimitri, who I think has ties to Ukraine, calling from Old Bridge. Dimitri, you're on WNYC. Hi.

Dimitri: I'm here. Hi, Brian, thank you for everything you do. I read Washington Post, so I know everything you guys are talking about. Thank you. My point is that, as you mentioned, actually you made my point that Ukraine gave up nuclear arsenal in 1994, I think in exchange for territorial integrity. The United States, the UK, I think later, it was France and Russia as well, they signed this memorandum. In 2014, when Russia invaded Ukraine the first time, we did almost nothing. There were very little sanctions involved, and that's about it.

Now I have to say we're doing a lot and I really appreciate everything United States and allies are doing but we're still self-deterring ourselves from getting more involved. That Budapest Memorandum it turned out to be, I think one of the worthless pieces of paper ever signed, in my opinion. I don't know, is our signature almost meaningless? In 2014, it was, now are we limiting ourselves?

The other part that I don't understand is why sending javelins and stingers, and then there's a lot of other stuff we're sending that basically kills Russian soldiers right now. One of the reasons Ukraine is fighting so well, unexpectedly, is because of our military support and the equipment we sent, the weapons, the training, but then we're deterring ourselves from sending more. What difference does it make if we also send the mix or something else because we're already doing it with other weapons, they will kill Russian soldiers just the same?

Brian: Oh, that's an interesting question.

Dimitri: Why are we afraid of Putin in this case? Brian, just one more question I have is why we're not defending Ukraine because it's not a NATO? Because we signed a memorandum, now Finland is not a NATO. We can invade Finland. What about Moldova, Georgia? Why not draw the line now, because eventually, we're going to have to deal with him anyway. Those are the quick points I wanted to make.

Brian: Dimitri thank you. Thank you very much. I guess that on that last one, it's a question Karoun. Will "We have to deal with him anyway?" Meaning he wants Ukraine, but does it mean he is going to go into the NATO member Baltic republics or somewhere else as if it was 1948?

Karoun Demirjian: [laughs] Dimitri raises three good points, and they're all interrelated in a way. I think that the thinking is that Putin doesn't really want to pick a fight with NATO. That's why he's willing to go whole hog into Ukraine, but not into Poland. The hope is that he won't go start playing futsi with the ball sticks, but I don't think there's confidence on that front. I think a lot of people who would've said that's a real non-starter, he would never do that two and a half weeks ago would now say it's a real possibility.

Fortunately for Ukraine, I think that the sad fact of the matter is that it really depends on what Russia's experience is in Ukraine whether or not they choose to expand the aperture of what they're doing and pick a fight with the Eastern flank of NATO. If Ukraine entires out the Russian forces and it's just not worth it, then the odds of Russia deciding to try to grab some territory like that corridor between Belarus and Kaliningrad that would effectively split the Baltics off from the rest of Europe, that's one of the most likely areas he could target.

It makes it less likely if the Ukrainians put up a fight [unintelligible 00:11:42]. When the Ukrainians say, "We're fighting Europe's war." They're not wrong, but there is a very hard line between the NATO borders and where Ukraine is. There is a defensive alliance, there's a treaty pact there. We've promised that if somebody tries to invoke Article 5, one of the members and the NATO countries agree that it's legitimate that you will come to mutual defense.

Now, that doesn't specify exactly what any one country would send to defend that attacked country, but at least there is that commitment there, and that I think is very, very different than the commitments in the Budapest Memorandum. This is the problem. Not all treaties are created equal. The Budapest Memorandum also I should say, not treaty, but memorandum, it gives Ukraine guarantees-- frankly, Russia is breaking. You're not supposed to mess with its sovereignty.

You are not supposed to use various weapons, nuclear weapons included against them except for in cases of self-defense, but the only commitment that the other countries made to Ukraine if Ukraine is attacked is to take the issue to the United Nations Security Council and give it serious consideration. That is not a promise to take up arms. It's not even a promise to impose sanctions. Unfortunately, all of this stuff the West is doing right now is at will. It is not required under the Budapest Memorandum.

Even if the spirit of the Budapest Memorandum says morally this should be done it's not a commitment that was made. I think that's something that a lot of people assume it's stronger than it is, and that's unfortunate for Ukraine right now. The last thing Dimitri was talking about was the MiGs. Yes, this has been a discussion now for over a week about why not send them these warplanes that they know how to operate, or at least know how to operate a close relative of.

Poland has some. We were talking about maybe the United States backfilling the Polish supply of MiGs with other sorts of planes if they sent them, but this again goes back to what I was talking about with Russians having put basically an umbrella of firepower over Ukraine. They can shoot planes down out of the sky pretty much anywhere. They do not have full air superiority right now. It's contested who owns the airspace of Ukraine, and it depends locality to locality who seems to have the upper hand, but there's a lot of risk associated with putting a manned aircraft, a Ukrainian fighter jet into the sky which seems to be why they haven't used everything they have at their disposal.

I'm not going to go so far as to say it's a suicide mission because I don't know, but it's a lot of risk to put a person in that plane knowing what the Russians have and what they're willingto shoot at those planes. I think that that is a consideration that the west is taking really to heart. Dimitri's right. When you're sending javelins, you're sending stingers, these can do damage on the ground. It's what I was saying before. It may be picking off target, target, target a little bit slower than if you had planes in the sky. The planes don't have free rain in the sky.

The planes may not be able to do that much if they can't stay up in the sky very long before they get shot down. These are all the odds, and various things that the West is weighing as they argue amongst each other about what's best to send, and as they look at what they've got that's in production or in stores is ready to send right now.

Brian: That is a lot.

Karoun Demirjian: That's a lot. I'm sorry. [laughs]

Brian: That is where we're going to have to leave it. No, that's not a criticism. Thank you for explaining it so well, and I think the Budapest Memorandum which a lot of people don't know about is something that has been coming up recently especially in Ukrainian appeals to the US to do more militarily than it's doing. What you gave was a very clear description of what the US signed onto and did not sign onto with that deal back then which was basically for Ukraine to give up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons in exchange for territorial integrity.

The Russians were supposed to respect that territorial integrity, and obviously, they are not, but it didn't commit the US as you explained, to a defense treaty per see. Obviously, this goes on day by day. Obviously, we will continue to talk about it on the show. Obviously so will the Washington Post continue to cover it including with Karoun Demirjian who covers national security and the Pentagon for the Washington Post. Karoun, thank you so much.

Karoun Demirjian: Thank you so much.

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