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Brian Lehrer: It's The Brian Lehrer Show on WNYC. Good morning, everyone. On the death of Alexei Navalny, Donald Trump seems to be playing it kind of like he played the white supremacist rally in Charlottesville in 2017, when he famously said, there were good people on both sides. As usual, Trump is not condemning Putin. The Washington Post reminds us this morning that when Navalny was first poisoned by Putin, that was in 2000, while Trump was president, Trump was asked by Navalny to denounce the poisoning, and he did not.

Asked by others, Trump deflected, saying instead, things like, we should focus on China. Now, Trump is, again, saying nothing bad about Putin. Instead, he's comparing himself to Navalny, saying the Biden administration is out to imprison him, never mind that Trump is facing criminal charges for actual alleged crimes brought by grand juries of his peers, most not even in federal court.

Navalny was poisoned, imprisoned, and now apparently, murdered for expressing his views. More than 400, this is just breaking, 400 new arrests are being reported in Russia over the last day of people simply out at vigils for Navalny. Donald Trump is not condemning those arrests. His rival for the Republican Presidential nomination Nikki Haley said this over the weekend on CNN about Trump's silence regarding Putin.

Nikki Haley: The problem is, anybody that can't call out a dictator, that's a problem. He should be calling-- Not just calling Putin out for what happened to Nalvany, he should be calling Putin out for the fact that he's got Evan Gershkovich as a hostage. He should be calling Putin out for invading Ukraine. He should be calling Putin out for the fact that, now they are surrounding the Baltics, and Putin is getting ready for his next act.

Brian Lehrer: Never mind that she mispronounced Navalny as Nalvany. We'll forgive her that. Nikki Haley on CNN. She did do it multiple times. One other ominous intersection between Trump's and Putin's latest authoritarian moves though, Trump is claiming in court that he could have his political rivals assassinated while president, and be immune from prosecution for it. We played this clip before. This is an actual exchange between a Federal Appeals Court judge and a Trump attorney on this question. The questions are coming from the bench a few weeks ago.

Judge Florence Pan: Could a president order SEAL Team Six to assassinate a political rival, that's an official act and order to SEAL Team Six?

John Sauer: He would have to be, and would speedily be impeached and convicted before the criminal prosecution.

Judge Florence Pan: If he weren't, there would be no criminal prosecution, no criminal liability for that?

John Sauer: Chief Justice's opinion over against Matheson and our constitution [unintelligible 00:03:10] and the plain language of the impeachment judgment clause all clearly presuppose that, what the founders were concerned about was not--

Judge Florence Pan: I asked you a "yes" or "no" question. Could a president who ordered SEAL Team Six to assassinate a political rival, who was not impeached, would he be subject to criminal prosecution?

John Sauer: If he were impeached and convicted first--

Judge Florence Pan: Your answer is "no"?

John Sauer: My answer is qualified "yes".

Brian Lehrer: Very qualified. That was January 9th, Judge Florence Pan of the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit and Trump Attorney John Sauer saying, "Only if he is impeached and convicted first." We know, for the foreseeable future, it appears there will be enough of a Trump wing in the Senate to avoid that with a 2/3rds majority of the Senate needed to remove a president from office.

If Trump wins that case, which is now in front of the Supreme Court, he, like Putin, would be able to assassinate political rivals with no criminal charges, and he is explicitly asking the Supreme Court of the United States to allow him to do it. There is not just a Russian context for the death of Alexei Navalny, but the US and global one too.

With me now, Idrees Kahloon, Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist. He has two relevant articles in the last week called, National conservatives are forging a global front against liberalism, and The growing peril of national conservatism, published on the day before Navalny's death became known. Idrees, thanks for coming on. Welcome back to WNYC.

Idrees Kahloon: Great. Thank you for having me.

Brian Lehrer: We'll get to your big picture take on national conservatism, and what ties Trump and Putin and others together right now, and the peril that you see in that, but first, on the death of Navalny, do you see world leaders dividing up into pro-Putin and anti-Putin camps?

Idrees Kahloon: On the whole, the mood has been condemnatory of Navalny's death. You see that in America as well, where President Biden blamed Vladimir Putin for Navalny's death, and said that no one should be fooled. Of course, to give the context, he was poisoned by Novichok nerve agent, probably, at the behest of Russian agents. Even in the Republican primary, you've seen Nikki Haley basically echo that, and say that Putin is responsible.

Donald Trump has been fairly silent. He hasn't said anything condemning Navalny's death, and that is something that Haley is attacking him for at the moment, but we don't know whether or not he will say anything. In the past, if you remember back to that moment in Helsinki, where he stood next to Vladimir Putin, and said that he trusted his assessment over his own spy agencies. Trump has been consistently hesitant to criticize Vladimir Putin, and it seems like he's choosing this moment as well to be circumspect.

Brian Lehrer: Well, what do you make of what Trump is doing, trying to say that he's a victim of his government like Navalny was in Russia, without denouncing Putin? It's kind of good people on both sides, isn't it?

Idrees Kahloon: It's certainly a bit of that. Look, Trump can complain about the prosecutions that he is enduring, but to compare himself to a man who was poisoned, then sentenced to the Gulag for 19 years, and ultimately died there, I think is a bit beyond the pale, even for past comparisons. This is also not a total shock to many people, given his history.

Given, even the comments last week that he gave, where he said that, not only would he not defend NATO allies that had not met their 2% GDP defense commitments, but that he would encourage Russia, if they invaded, to go for it really. That is beyond what any normal presidential candidate, Democrat or Republican, would have uttered.

Brian Lehrer: This, "I'm like Navalny," it's not just Trump saying it on social media. I see there are other Republicans, Lee Zeldin is one, I saw reported, former Congressman from New York, the Republican gubernatorial candidate in New York in 2022, Lee Zeldin and other Republicans echoing that, and saying Trump is like the Navalny of the United States. How far do you think that's going to get as Washington Bureau Chief?

Idrees Kahloon: Look, I think there are many voters who are going to look that favorably on that comparison. I think it is the most outrageous thing that could be said about Navalny's death, and it is fundamentally solipsistic. It changes the emphasis to not the plight of this man, nor the plight of democracy in Russia, which is, I think, an incredibly sad story, but it changes it back to, "Well, look at me. Look at how persecuted I am."

Again, look, from his perspective, I understand why you would complain about judges and prosecutors and whatnot, but to argue that there is any comparison between these two people, I think, is plainly outrageous.

Brian Lehrer: Listeners, we can take phone calls this morning for Idrees Kahloon, the Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist. Your questions or comments, 212-433-WNYC, 212-433-9692, call or text. There was, as you know, a major conference of Western leaders over the weekend called the Munich Security Conference. The New York Times article on it this morning begins by saying, "As the leaders of the West gathered in Munich over the past three days, Putin had a message for them. Nothing they've done so far, sanctions, condemnation, attempted containment, would alter his intentions to disrupt the current world order."

I'm curious if you think, Idrees, that the murder of Navalny, assuming it was murder ordered by Putin, was timed to break on Friday, specifically to thumb his nose at all the countries attending that conference?

Idrees Kahloon: Look, that's plausible. It is also the case that Russia is going to have a presidential election in a few weeks, in which the result is obviously preordained. Vladimir Putin will win another term. The death of Navalny signifies, and it extinguishes the dissent within Russia, which had already been heavily limited as you know. As repressive as Russia was before the war in Ukraine, it's become even more so afterwards.

Even now, at this moment, Russian police are arresting anyone who expresses sympathy for Navalny, people who have photos in their backpack of Navalny are being arrested by police, people who are leaving flowers at makeshift memorials are being arrested by police. This, I think, could also be interpreted as a show of complete control ahead of the Russian elections, but to his point that he's on the ascendancy, I think that there are some credible points there.

Republicans in Congress here have lost the will to fund Ukraine any further. Ukraine just lost a major city, and had to give it up to Russia. They blamed the lack of artillery for that loss. It could be the case that Russia pushes even further, and sanctions and the other tools that the West has arrayed against him, they've certainly stalled him, but they haven't changed his calculus. I think that, that is-- There's a reason why the mood in Munich was quite gloomy.

Brian Lehrer: The Times goes on to say, "Warnings about Mr. Putin's possible next moves were mixed with Europe's growing worries that it could soon be abandoned by the United States, the one power that has been at the core of its defense strategy for 75 years. It reminds us, Trump had famously said last week that if Europe didn't spend more toward its own defense as the NATO treaty calls for, he would encourage Putin to attack." You cited this a minute ago. Are the European countries now pledging to meet that obligation of 2% of their economies on defense, as Trump has been pushing them to do ever since he was president?

Idrees Kahloon: The Germans just announced that they were hitting 2% of GDP in defense spending. Over his presidency, Trump's threats were effective, I think you have to say that, in getting European countries to actually increase their defense spending. If you look at the data, you see a pretty marked increase over the time that he's president, that there is this fear that there would be a penalty for free riding.

Trump's view of NATO is just starkly different from what an alliance-oriented view would actually have you say. Trump sees this as a contract, where if you pay your 2%, you get protection. It's a bit like a racket. That is a transactional understanding of NATO. It is one that sees America as providing a service. It makes, I think, a few mistakes. One is that, the NATO alliance is also good for America in a way that Trump doesn't seem to fully grasp, or understand.

To your question about what the Europeans are doing, there's always been discussion about a European army, Ursula von der Leyen, and the Head of the European Commission said that, there would be interest in maybe European spending on defense collectively. That's something that traditionally hasn't happened before. There are moves towards thinking about what Europe could do, what NATO members could do without America at the core.

Trump's election, if it happened, would only be nine months from now. It's actually not that much time, if you're Europe, and having to deal with this very, I would say, almost existential question.

Brian Lehrer: Yes. On it being an existential question, Nikolai Denkov, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, is quoted in The Times saying, the war in Ukraine is about, "Whether the democratic world we value can be beaten, and this is now well understood in Europe," he said. Maybe, Idrees, that's a good jumping off point for you to define national conservatism, as you use it in your reporting.

Idrees Kahloon: Yes. National conservatism is a new ideological strain within conservatism that really is very, very different from what dominated before. It is the upside-down version of Reaganism and Thatcherism, and it's exemplified by people like Donald Trump. It is one that values basically national sovereignty above everything else, and the particular vision of nationalism within a state.

It is one that steers away from the traditional emphasis on individual freedom, small government, free markets, et cetera. It is just a very different view of what being a conservative is. The point of this piece is that, it's not just America where these ideas have taken off. Hungary is an example of a place where these ideas have been used by Viktor Orbán to bring effect to legitimize his rule there.

You see the Polish Law and Justice Party also had a very similar vision. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni descended from parties that embrace these kinds of ideas. They are mounting, at this point, in a serious intellectual challenge to what it means to be a conservative. The connection with Russia, I think, is harder to make at some points. Certainly, some of the people in this movement expressed mostly before the war in Ukraine, although Tucker Carlson's an exception, but mostly, they expressed admiration for Putin before that.

That's because Putin had cleverly positioned himself as a warrior in this culture war. He embraced the Russian Orthodox Church. He was anti-LGBT. He said that, he was fighting the West and its decadence. There was some admiration there. I think a lot of that has dissipated, except for Tucker, but that idea that there needs to be an alliance across borders to attack globalization, to attack international liberalism, is not only strong, but it's, I think, growing.

Brian Lehrer: Listener writes, why do you call these reactionary fascists conservatives? What of the present day do they want to conserve? They can't conserve the past.

Idrees Kahloon: In their defense, what they are saying that they want to conserve is the family, the community, and oftentimes religion, oftentimes a cultural sense of the nation. That is what they are aiming to preserve. That's what they say they are preserving. I think it is incorrect to call them fascist. I think that the set of folks that I'm talking to, autocracy and autocratic tendencies are there, but I think fascism is marked by an expansionist ideology, seeking to go beyond borders, to conquer great stretches of land.

It often has a strong association with genocide, which again, I'm not talking about Putin. I don't lump Putin into this group, but I think that that is somewhat inaccurate phrasing. Also, I think that sometimes "fascism", I think of as the thought-stopping word for political discussion. We say okay, "Fascist bad. Therefore, I don't need to-- I can dismiss these folks." I guess my point is that you shouldn't.

You need to take their ideas very seriously. You need to understand what is propelling this political project, because it is scoring highly in democratic societies across Europe, and certainly in America. I think that just saying, "Well, it's fascist and, therefore, it's not worth examining closely," I think, would be incorrect.

Brian Lehrer: Jim, in Ocean County in Jersey, you're on WNYC with Idrees Kahloon, Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist. Hi, Jim.

Jim: Yes. This is ridiculous going over-- Everything, it should go back to the whole link of Trump being a Russian asset. The Manafort worked to displace, or after Yanukovych was replaced, and all the activity in Ukraine. Then, he became the campaign manager for Trump, and the Kilimnik information that was passed that Trump is a blatant Russian asset.

Brian Lehrer: Thank you, Jim, and another listener along those lines writes, Trump is the Manchurian candidate, which references an old piece of fiction from the Cold War. Anything on the importance of for how long Trump has been a Putin ally? Jim, I think rightly takes us back to Paul Manafort, takes us back to the Russia investigation. Even though that faded with a whimper, there was a lot there. Does it matter that Trump has been an ally of Putin for like 10 years now?

Idrees Kahloon: Look, I think it goes too far to say that Trump is a Putin ally. We had the Mueller investigation that examined a lot of these accusations, and I trust the special counsel to have unearthed evidence, if that was really the case. Maybe your recollection is different, but I did not feel that he compellingly demonstrated anything to that effect. Obviously, it is important.

Brian Lehrer: Well, whether there was actual collusion between the Trump campaign and the government of Russia is a different question, I think, than whether Trump is a Putin ally, right?

Idrees Kahloon: Yes.

Brian Lehrer: He was saying nice things about Putin in the 2016 campaign.

Idrees Kahloon: Yes, he certainly says nice things about Putin. The Helsinki Moment where they stood next to each other, and he took the word of Putin over his own intelligence agencies was a low point for his presidency. Obviously, it again goes back to this inversion of what conservatism means that Ronald Reagan, the Cold War Warrior, is now, his successor is a man who takes Putin's side.

If you look within the party itself, J.D. Vance and Tucker Carlson, of these folks, sometimes if you read their analysis of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, you don't get the sense that they think that Ukraine is the victim. You get the sense sometimes they think that Ukraine is the villain, and that is a very stark and upsetting departure from what it means. I think that we need to understand that Trumpism, as a phenomenon, is one that sprung up from domestic sources.

It's not a externally imposed Manchurian candidate takeover of the government, that would excuse the necessary introspection that's needed to understand what's going on here. I don't think it's just as simple as that.

Brian Lehrer: Patricia in Livingston, New Jersey you're on WNYC. Hi, Patricia.

Patricia: Oh, hi there. Good morning. I just think it would be worthwhile to mention that in Trump's perception of NATO, he portrays it as these foreign governments aren't paying their enough money to the US to support NATO function. That's quite contrary. The nations in NATO are required to spend on their own military. Their commitment is to pay their own military to support NATO functions, and that just misrepresents a whole situation.

Brian Lehrer: Patricia, I guess Trump's point although he misrepresents it, I've heard him do it just in the last few days. He makes it sound like they owe money to the United States, and they're not paying.

Patricia: Correct.

Brian Lehrer: Even though it's what you say, but I think if he was pressed further, he would say, the point is still, that if they're not contributing what they are obligated to under the treaty to NATO's defense, then it puts more of a burden on the US taxpayer when spending needs to be done.

Patricia: I get your point, but I think you give him far too much credit for that.

Brian Lehrer: For thinking it through to that degree. Thank you. Well, Idrees, maybe it's worth giving everybody a little refresher on what that requirement actually is, because Patricia got it right, and why it is.

Idrees Kahloon: I think Patricia was right. NATO is an alliance. There is an Article 5 guarantee that basically says that, if one member of NATO is attacked, all of NATO will actually contribute to its defense, will come to its defense. Actually, that's only been invoked once on behalf of the United States after 9/11. It hasn't happened in the other countries, but NATO's guidelines also say that, every country ought to spend 2% of their GDP on defense spending each year.

As Patricia said, that's on their own defense as well. It's not pooled together, although there is a lot of sharing of information, and standards of operation and whatnot. That summary is exactly right, but that 2% is a guideline. It is not a, if you are delinquent, you are kicked out of the club. The club is about a military alliance against invasion, and to even threaten to not honor Article 5, I think emboldens the enemies of NATO, principally Russia.

I think you've already seen that. I think that Trump has already, despite the fact that he's no longer in office, his comments alone have already shaken NATO. You even see some people in NATO say that explicitly that Trump's comments have made scenarios that they thought were impossible more likely now, and that's not good.

Brian Lehrer: We'll continue in a minute with Idrees Kahloon, who's the Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist. More of your calls and texts to 212-433-WNYC. When we come back, I want to question you a little bit on this premise that the Putin alliance aside, that Trumpism, or what you call national conservatism is so different from Reaganism. We'll do that and more. Stay with us. Brian Lehrer on WNYC.

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Brian Lehrer: Brian Lehrer on WNYC, as we continue with Idrees Kahloon, Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist. He's got a couple of articles that came out last week just before the death of Alexei Navalny was announced, including one called The growing peril of national conservatism. If you listen to part 1 of our conversation before the break, we were talking about ways in which Idrees contrasts national conservatism, the rising conservatism today with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher conservatism.

I actually wonder if they're as different as people sometimes say, and this is obviously not just you, Idrees, making this contrast. You say, Reagan and Thatcher were for the free movement of capital across borders, and fairly liberal immigration. They were for building alliances through strong international institutions like NATO. They were more in favor of military intervention in the Cold War era, than Trump and company rhetoric, which is skeptical of foreign wars.

You say the new national conservatives economic policies are more aligned with the left's style of thinking, skeptical of big business, willing to accept a big welfare state, concerned with working class hardships, and protecting domestic businesses through protectionism, your words. Let's go down that list. To me the only thing that really checks the box as the opposite of Reagan, is opposition to immigration.

Let me question you on some of the others. You say skeptical of big business, and concerned with working class hardships a little like the left. Didn't Trump in office give big tax breaks to the wealthy, and to corporations? Oppose Obamacare, or Medicare for all. Oppose legislation that gives more rights to unions. Oppose an increase in the minimum wage. Oppose family leave, paid family leave, cut food stamps, which go to many employed people, and I could go on.

Idrees Kahloon: Yes, that's right. Trump's signature policy, which was the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is a callback to the Paul Ryan style of politics, the George Bush style of politics. You're correct, it's Reaganist in that sense. What I'm talking about here is a difference in economic views. I think you see this more in the trade policy that Trump inaugurated when he was in office, that was something he had control over, and that's something that he moved very aggressively to install protectionist barriers, not just against China, but against allies such as Canada.

Even that is the opposite of Reaganism. He campaigned against NAFTA, against the WTO. That is in economic terms very different from Reagan. The other point is that, Trump's distinction from previous iterations of Republicans, Mitt Romney, George Bush, Paul Ryan, was his attitude towards entitlement spending. Republicans would get into trouble because they would say things like, "Well, we know we need to ultimately privatize elements of this social safety net."

Trump threw gut populous instinct to realize that, that was a vote loser. He has said, and still says today that he has no intention of cutting benefits for social security, or cutting benefits for Medicare and Medicaid. In terms of the intellectuals attached to this movement, and the kinds of things that they're arguing for, I think that if you read what J.D. Vance and Marco Rubio and Josh Hawley were saying about, for example, an expanded Child Tax Credit.

That's very different from what Ronald Reagan was saying about welfare queens, and his skepticism about cash handouts. I think that there is something actually serious afoot in terms of the economic policy,

Brian Lehrer: Skeptical of big business, where is it, other than say to criticize Disney for having gay characters and some of their stories, and other policies that the new right ties to so-called wokism in the workplace?

Idrees Kahloon: No, I think that's it. I think the cozy alliance between big business and the Republican party has been broken up. A lot of it is over these cultural concerns about wokeness, about ESG, DEI policies, and these sorts of things. You see, as a-- I would certainly count Ron DeSantis as an exemplary member of the national conservatives, and you see that his attitude there was to, basically, treat Disney punitively for having the temerity to criticize him.

I think you see that in the rhetoric certainly among this new breed of Republicans. You're right that the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reflected that old style of Republican governance. I think, rhetorically, if you look at what's happened since it's a very different relationship.

Brian Lehrer: It just seems to me it's a different relationship only on culture war grounds, not on economic grounds. It makes me think, isn't the core here not about war, or big business, or the working class very much at all, but about race, and identity, and theocracy. They see poor people of color as getting over on white, working in middle class taxpayers like Reagan did.

They want to indulge their hatred of LGBTQ people, and Christian dominance over Islam. Sometimes it's Judeo-Christian dominance when it's convenient to frame it that way for them. At Charlottesville, of course, it was Jews will replace us. Isn't this new right so much about identity?

Reagan too ran on so-called welfare queens, bilking the American taxpayer, part of his political core, which was also about a backlash to the social and economic progressivism of the '60s and '70s. He was against affirmative action. How much do you really think this is a turnabout from Reaganism, rather than an heir to it in the culture war sense?

Idrees Kahloon: I do still think that it is a turnabout for Reaganism. I think fundamentally, at the level of just outlook. Reagan thought America was the shining city on the hill. That America had values that it ought to be proud of, and that the rest of the world ought to be like it. Trumpism, and this new strain of conservatism argues the exact opposite. That America is beset by carnage, that it is being overrun, that its institutions have been captured by hostile ideology, et cetera.

It is fundamentally decliners. That is, I think, the opposite of how Reagan saw America. I think if you go to your point about, is this about identity? I think it is about identity. I think it's a feeling that the right is losing the culture war, and that things are changing too quickly. Now, I think that there's this paradox which is that, if it's all about hostility to race, why is it that Republicans are making inroads among non-white voters? Particularly, among Hispanic voters, who have shifted pretty sharply towards the right, while Donald Trump has been in office.

There's also polling and election results that suggest that Trump has made inroads among African American men. I don't think that it can be as simply reduced to, "Well, this is just about white supremacy, and antagonism towards race." I think there's something complicated that's going on. It ties into identity, and identity means, for a lot of people, hostility to especially, illegal immigration in particular.

The left, I think has been a bit slow to respond to that. You see Joe Biden attempting to do some stuff on the border. I think that it's been difficult, and I think that the enemies of liberalism, and that's what I think that national conservatism is at its core, have seized on that, and have made a lot of political progress as a result of that.

Brian Lehrer: Kitty in Manhattan. You're on WNYC with Idrees Kahloon, Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist. Hi, Kitty.

Kitty: Hi, there. I want him to talk a little bit about the fact that there's still money coming from corporations to the 147 people in the House, who are the Republican obstructionist to mega people. You need to talk about the corporate power that's still behind the scenes rooting for Trump, Trumpism, and that would be Laissez-faire capitalism. He needs to talk about that a little bit.

There was a CREW study that recently showed that corporations that said they would not support the mega stuff, are still giving money to those 147 people, the deniers of the election. They are still doing that. He needs to talk a little bit about whose dark money that's still flowing to the Trump mega operation.

Brian Lehrer: Kitty. Thank you. Idrees, anything on that?

Idrees Kahloon: Yes. Corporations said that they would suspend payments after January 6th, and they've gone back on that. Corporations, basically, a lot of the big ones, give equal measure to Democrats and Republicans, so that they have some amount of ability to talk to people. I think that I spent a lot of time studying campaign finance. Individual contributions matter a lot more, in terms of size, than the corporate donations do.

That's the big ballast behind the billion dollars or so that every campaign is going to have behind them. I think that, in terms of how much it is actually affecting our politics, I'm somewhat skeptical that it's the driver of a lot of this dysfunction.

Brian Lehrer: Let me touch one more thing before we run out of time. Also, at the Munich Security Conference this weekend, another big topic was Israel and Gaza. The President of Israel, Chaim Herzog, and the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Mohammad Shtayyeh, were both at the conference. Herzog said, the hostages are his number one concern right now. The Palestinian Prime Minister, Shtayyeh said this.

Mohammad Shtayyeh: Our top priority now is to end the aggression against our people, to end the war, and also to allow international aid to get into Gaza, but also what is more important, is a political solution, not only for Gaza, but for all of Palestine, that does material in a two-state reality, where countries do recognize Palestine as a state, and Palestine will be admitted as a member state to the United Nation.

Brian Lehrer: Palestinian Prime Minister, Mohammad Shtayyeh, to the news organization, CGTN. Idrees, do you see a Western coalition of any kind pressuring both Israel directly, and Hamas through Qatar and Saudi Arabia maybe, to end this war in some way?

Idrees Kahloon: There is already pressure on Israel, and particularly, warning against a ground invasion of Rafah, which is where more than a million Palestinians are now have fled to, and are living in camp cities. The leaders of Canada and Australia have said that. Emmanuel Macron, the French President said that, invading Rafah would be a grave violation of international law.

Biden has not gone so far as that, but he has said that, he had warned publicly that Israel shouldn't invade Rafah, and avoid that, and that there needs to be a plan. America has not gone as far as other countries in saying that there ought to be a ceasefire, but they are negotiating very strenuously with the Qataris, with the Egyptians, to get a deal in place that would, hopefully, resolve some of these issues.

America, publicly is committed to two-state solution. The problem is that, Hamas is not. Hamas still at its core says that, it aims for the elimination of the Jewish state, and Netanyahu is not. That is an issue. He is cautioned against recognition of Palestinian statehood. He has said that that would be a reward for October 7th, if that were to happen.

That is the hurdles that America faces. Right now, as much as Joe Biden did his best to embrace the Israelis after the horrific attack, tensions between him and Netanyahu are extremely high, and so that is not a great relationship at the moment.

Brian Lehrer: I see that the photos on page 1 of your article on the perils of national conservatism are of Trump, Orbán of Hungary, Meloni of Italy, someone I don't recognize, and Netanyahu. Where do you think Netanyahu fits in to that larger picture? Certainly, in the weakening of the judiciary category, which is something you say ties these national conservative leaders together. We know he's tried to do that in Israel. Where do you think he fits in big picture?

Idrees Kahloon: I think that is a common tendency, that judicial reform, which was incredibly controversial when he tried to push it through this feeling that state institutions and separation of power is something that constrains an executive, and that state power ought to be unchecked. I think is one thing that he has in common. The other point, this is not a national conservative thing, but the other thing he has in common with Trump is that, being in office is currently keeping him out of jail.

He's under investigation, has been charged with corruption. The time that he's in office, I think also limits his accountability in the democratic sense. I think that that is another commonality that you see there. Of course, Israeli nationalism is very different from American nationalism. At least, because of its clear Jewish roots compared to some of the American nationalists are much more Christian in their orientation, of course.

The founding of Israel itself, it was a nationalist cause. I think that, that has been turned in direction under Netanyahu, which is very different from how someone like Benny Gantz, if he were to be the next Prime Minister, would see it and would use it.

Brian Lehrer: Well, Biden, we keep hearing, and this is for you as Washington Bureau Chief covering the Presidential campaigns. Biden is getting increasingly fed up with Netanyahu's refusal to protect civilians more, while fighting Hamas. Biden might not accept the word "genocide", but he does increasingly believe and articulate that, what Israel is doing in Gaza is horrific.

Now, there are reports in this country of Arab Americans in the swing state of Michigan saying, they won't vote for Biden in November, because he is not different enough from Trump on Gaza, so Biden needs to be punished, to make sure there's at least one party that cares about them. Also, NBC News reported this weekend on the reproductive justice movement, now fracturing over the harm to thousands of pregnant women, and new mothers in Gaza, that the US isn't doing anything about, as they see it.

Some of those activists say, they won't vote for Biden, even though he is nominally pro-choice, because reproductive justice is more than just access to abortion. I'm curious how much you see at this point, the politics of Gaza, if not the morality, as Biden sees it, affecting what he might do next on this war?

Idrees Kahloon: Well, I think you can see that the Biden campaign is concerned about this abandon Biden movement among some Muslim Americans. The campaign has sent several high-level folks to Michigan to meet with Muslims there, and to speak with them. Sometimes they've turned that down. They've said, "We don't want to meet with you," but they're devoting some amount of attention to it, which suggests to me that they do actually worry about the consequences of this.

On the whole, it's true that Americans don't really factor foreign policy into their voting decisions, particularly, if there aren't troops involved, as is the case in Ukraine, and as is the case in Israel. Obviously, to some Americans, to Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, even who aren't Arab and have family there, but feel a kinship with the Palestinians, this issue matters a lot.

I think we can question whether or not abandoning Biden is cutting off one's nose, despite one's face, but the anger is quite real, it's quite palpable. I know that from my own family, and my own family friends. The Democrats, I think do have to deal with it. Biden has moved closer and closer to criticizing Israel. He said that, their actions in Gaza were over the top. That was a direct quote that he gave.

For a lot of Muslims, they see the fact that America's still sending artillery, still sending ammunition, not calling for a ceasefire. They say that talk is cheap, but action is different. I think it could be an issue. Obviously, Michigan's an incredibly important swing state, but we have a lot of months between now and November. Things could also change.

Brian Lehrer: Idrees Kahloon, Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist. His article is out the other day, National Conservatives are forging a Global Front Against Liberalism and one called the Perils of National Conservatism. Thanks for joining us. We really appreciate it a lot.

Idrees Kahloon: Great. Thank you so much.

 

 

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