Brian Lehrer: It's The Brian Lehrer Show on WNYC. Good morning again, everyone. We've been doing various segments on Christianity, Judaism, and Islam during this Abrahamic holy month, a rare occurrence when the three major Western religions are all having major holidays at the same time: Passover, Easter, and Ramadan. Passover and Easter always coincide, as many of you know, Ramadan moves through the year, so this is a rare confluence of all three. This week we will observe Holocaust Remembrance Day, which Lance was just referring to in the newscast, tomorrow with an oral history call-in for Holocaust survivors. Friday, we'll celebrate the Eid, the last day of Ramadan, and the end of the series with a what's on your table call-in for the night of the feast.

Right now, we acknowledge that Eastern Orthodox Easter was yesterday, not last weekend. It's a week after when other Christian denominations celebrate it. We acknowledge that Orthodox Easter comes this year at a difficult time politically and in human rights terms for many. The Russian Orthodox Church, that branch, is playing a highly supportive role, supportive of Putin that is, in the war in Ukraine. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says that support has only grown more strident as the war has progressed. We'll explain why politically, but we also have to ask what would Jesus think about that.

This also leaves the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, a branch of the Russian church, in a kind of spiritual and political crossfire, as well as a literal one. One example, the holy site in Kyiv, known in English as the Church of the Caves, I believe, has been the site of a standoff where the Ukrainian government evicted some monks there who were seen as pro-invasion, and the monks refused to leave. We'll talk about that and more now with Aristotle "Telly" Papanikolaou. He holds the Archbishop Demetrios Chair in Orthodox Theology and Culture at Fordham University, and is co-founding director there of the Orthodox Christian Studies Center.

Professor Papanikolaou, thanks so much for joining us. Happy Easter, and welcome to WNYC.

Professor Papanikolaou: You're welcome. Thank you for the good wishes, and thank you for inviting me.

Brian Lehrer: Can we do a little Eastern Orthodox 101 for listeners not familiar? Why is Easter a week later for your branch of Christianity?

Professor Papanikolaou: Well, I'm sorry for the shameful plug, but one piece of our center is a blog called Public Orthodoxy. If they Google it, they can find it easily. Honestly, on there we have, by a professor named John Fotopoulos from Saint Mary's College, Notre Dame, probably the absolute best explanation.

It's a bit complicated, but it really comes down to in Christianity, there was a debate about the dating of Easter. They settled this on a certain formula that had something to do with the after-the-spring equinox and the Jewish Passover, but the Orthodox calculate that according to the Julian calendar, while in the Western church, they calculate that, along with other factors, according to the Gregorian calendar, which is the more precise calendar. As a result, we have two different datings.

Brian Lehrer: All right. How many Orthodox Christians are there in the world roughly and what percentage of all Christians is that?

Professor Papanikolaou: That's a good question. I'm not exactly sure, to be honest with you. I think in terms of how many millions, usually the claim-- the Pew Research Center just came out a few years ago with a wonderful and really unique survey of Orthodox Christianity, especially within Eastern Europe. I really recommend that to your listeners. They say around 300 million. Whether that's accurate or not, I'm not sure, but they do say also that we are the second largest denomination.

Of course, we all know in Protestant Christianity, there are multiple denominations, so it could be that Protestant Christianity as a whole is larger than Orthodox Christianity, but Orthodox Christianity is the second largest Christian denomination.

Brian Lehrer: For the context of the war in Ukraine, if you know, what percentage of the people of Russia and what percentage of the people of Ukraine, roughly, are Orthodox Christians?

Professor Papanikolaou: I would say in Ukraine, 20% are Catholics and they're, of course, Greek Catholics, which means that they pretty much do liturgies and other rituals very similar to the Orthodox Church, but they are under the jurisdiction of the Pope of Rome. That would mean anywhere between 70% to 80% identify as Orthodox Christians in Ukraine.

In Russia, it's a little bit tricky here because, this is the kind of history I really wanted to get into a little bit, but after the communist situation, of course, practically- I mean, it was a very low percentage who identified as Orthodox Christian. What's very interesting is that recent polls indicate that up to 70% to 80% now identify as Orthodox Christian even though the percentage of churchgoers is extremely low. That's a huge shift that has something to do with some of the things we're going to talk about today.

Brian Lehrer: Yes. Well, keep going on that. What do you think that does have to do? Because, yes, that is the heart of the segment, now that we've done the warm-up.

Professor Papanikolaou: Right. It's still a little bit 101. I hope you don't mind if I start with a brief story. After the fall of communism, I remember seeing Pat Robertson, the famous Pentecostal televangelist and also a former presidential candidate, showing a blank map of Russia and basically saying to his listeners or to his viewers there like, "Okay, you see this map? There was no Christianity here. It's like an open field for us to go and missionize."

Of course that's absolutely, patently false. Christianity in that region goes back to about the 10th century. There's a famous legend and story where Prince Vladimir sent his emissaries to the Great Church of Constantinople, Hagia Sophia, which unfortunately, has been turned back into a mosque again, which we can discuss a little bit later as well, and they said, "We know not if we were in heaven or on earth."

Russia has a very, very, rich history of Orthodox Christianity. You can't really understand Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Rachmaninoff, any of those things really without that connection. Of course that was all decimated after the Communist Revolution. Tens of thousands of priests and monks and nuns and bishops were murdered. Thousands and thousands of church buildings were destroyed and ruined. Then after the fall of communism, it really was a little bit unclear at that point what role religion would play in Russia.

To compress things a little bit, it was really around 2011 or '12 that Putin-- It was on the heels of one of the more massive demonstrations, actually, after the presidential election in Moscow. It was really around that point that Putin started to draw off of the religious history and language of Russia. He really started to do it much more intentionally, much, much more explicitly, and he did it in such a way to position Russia- as a kind of geopolitical strategy to position Russia as this great defender of traditional values, so traditional values becomes a geopolitical strategy, as a great defender of traditional values against the godless West. He starts forging another East-West divide. This time not communism versus democracy because they still claim they're a democracy, but this time over traditional values and family values.

There's a professor in Rome, Kristina Stoeckl. She ran a wonderful, ERC-funded, postsecular complex project, and she maps all this out, how Russia over the past two decades has positioned itself as this kind of moralist international leader. [crosstalk]--

Brian Lehrer: If I could jump in for a second. It's one of the reasons, maybe the main reason, that Putin is so well-liked by the cultural Right in the culture wars in this country. Because he staked out these positions as anti-gay, traditionally macho masculine, in support of traditional gender roles, and so the American Right lines up with him. You're saying he used the Russian Orthodox Church in promoting that identity of his own.

Is the Russian Orthodox Church there? I mean, as you know, Protestant religions are all over the place in terms of how supportive they are of gay and gender rights.

Professor Papanikolaou: No, the Russian Orthodox Church is completely-- Look, the Russian Orthodox Church after the fall of communism worked really, really hard as an institution to regain its status within that society. Honestly, in the '90s, it was really unclear whether they would. That's why the 70% to 80% identification as Orthodox is crucial because somehow they succeeded in that and somewhere along the line, Putin started to really see the value of that.

There's evidence that-- The [unintelligible 00:10:04] Moscow wrote a recent piece recently, I can't remember where, but where he indicated that really, Putin from the beginning started putting FSB agents within the church, within various religious organizations. I think that the Russian Orthodox Church, they sort of made a deal with the devil. They wanted so desperately to have a certain status within Russian society again, but now to some extent, I think they have been relegated to a department of state, quite honestly, which is very similar to the way the church functioned under the czarist regime.

Brian Lehrer: Interesting. I mentioned in the intro, the report that the Russian Orthodox leader, Patriarch Kirill, is that how you say his name?

Professor Papanikolaou: Correct.

Brian Lehrer: Has been supportive of the invasion from the start. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which wrote that report, says he's been unwavering and actually more strident as time goes on in vocally supporting Putin. I guess my question about that is, does the Patriarch have a choice? Because we know what can happen to prominent Russians who speak against the big guy.

Professor Papanikolaou: Well, everybody has a choice. I think he has a choice of whether to be a martyr, basically, and give witness to what many believe really is the right and just Christian claim and declaration, which is this war was unprovoked, totally unnecessary and completely unjust, or he could do what he did. He always has a choice. I will say that if he did speak publicly against it, in my own judgment, the regime has so infiltrated the church and used it as a soft power mechanism over the past two decades, successfully, actually, that I would guess that if he did that, that he would have been replaced and probably they would have elected someone new.

I think the regime now has-- In many ways, it's no different than the Soviet system. The regime, to some extent, controls the institutional church. That doesn't mean that all Russian Orthodox agree with that because there are many Russian Orthodox Christians within Russia who disagree, and they tried to protest and they try to do what they can, but now it's become, yes, a very dangerous situation.

Brian Lehrer: I do want to invite some listeners into this conversation. If anyone out there right now is Eastern Orthodox and would like to call in, first priority to any Ukrainian Orthodox Christians, on the role of your church community locally, here or back in Ukraine, in supporting the people who have been invaded. Any Ukrainian Orthodox happen to be listening today, 212-433-WNYC, 212-433-9692. Or any Russian Orthodox listeners, which is where the conversation has focused so far, the Russian Orthodox Church in the context of Russia since the Cold War, 212-433-9692. For our guest, Aristotle "Telly" Papanikolaou, who is co-founding director of the Orthodox Christian Studies Center at Fordham. 212-433-WNYC, 212-433-9692.

I mentioned in the intro, the standoff at the holy site known as the Church of the Caves in Kyiv, a church and monastery complex, parts of which I see are 1,000 years old. Have you followed that enough to explain the basics of the standoff to our listeners, because I guess it's sort of Russian Orthodox versus Ukrainian Orthodox in a certain respect?

Professor Papanikolaou: In a certain respect, although many of the people within-- It's a huge complex as well, Lavra is a huge complex, are actually Ukrainians, but Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Of course, there are many Russian-speaking Ukrainians, although that's changing now. I followed enough, yes, in the sense that-- This is a little bit more complicated.

Basically again, the Russian Orthodox Church really had- the Moscow Patriarchate had jurisdictional control over most of the Orthodox Churches, a very large percentage of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. There was always a movement within Ukraine of having what's called an independent or autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Back in around 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarch, who's kind of like our Pope-like figure, he doesn't really have the powers of the Pope, but he's in Constantinople, present-day Istanbul, but he's the most visible global leader, symbol of Orthodox Christianity. He granted what's called the Tomos of Autocephaly to this Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which goes by the acronym OCU.

Still even after that, the Moscow Patriarchate before the war still had control over a very high percentage of the parishes, most of the parishes there. The situation has become such that, that church, it's called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate); when the war started, they soon cut ties with the Moscow Patriarchate, but there's still lingering suspicion that there are Russian sympathizers, Russian operatives within that particular institutional Orthodox Church structure in Ukraine. [crosstalk]--

Brian Lehrer: Complicated.

Professor Papanikolaou: Yes. Lavra is that monastery, very famous monastery pilgrimage site. Lavra is that site, which it's been always under Moscow Patriarchate and the government now is suspicious, I guess, that there are people there who would sympathize with the Russian Orthodox Church, but also sympathize with the Russian regime.

Brian Lehrer: We have, from what I've read, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church who we talked about, Patriarch Kirill, supporting the invasion, but the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church supporting Ukraine. His name, if I have it right, is Metropolitan Epiphanius. Do I have that right?

Professor Papanikolaou: Right, but he's the Metropolitan of the independent one, the one that the Ecumenical Patriarch just granted independence to. The other church, which was under the Moscow Patriarchate, the Metropolitan is a guy named Onufriy. It would make sense that the newly independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, obviously, would support the Ukrainian government in speaking out against the war is unequivocal. It's the other church that is under jurisdictional control of the Moscow Patriarchate that really has become the church that's the one that's under the cloud of suspicion, and is the one that controls Lavra and is the one that the government now is seeking to investigate, have a little bit more of an eye on in terms of seeing their collaboration.

Brian Lehrer: I have to say, by the way, that that is one of the great names of all time from any background, Metropolitan Epiphanius. I wish when my city kids were born I had thought to name them Metropolitan. [laughter] Is that a common name in Ukraine or anywhere?

Professor Papanikolaou: Yes, it is. Well, even in Greek, it's Epiphanius. Actually that's one thing we have going for us as Orthodox. We have pretty good names [crosstalk]--

Brian Lehrer: Oh, Epiphanius. Yes, I was thinking Metropolitan as the given name.

Professor Papanikolaou: [laughs] No, Metropolitan is a title like Bishop [crosstalk]--

Brian Lehrer: Oh, that's the title. Oh, now I get it. Okay, now I understand.

Professor Papanikolaou: It's a title as Bishop. We have [crosstalk] [inaudible 00:18:02] titles as bishops, and he's Metropolitan.

Brian Lehrer: Is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, or any of the divisions of it that you were just describing, playing a meaningful church community role, offering things churches might during wartime like food and shelter for refugees, or the supportive of a moral community?

Professor Papanikolaou: Oh, absolutely, yes. There's no question that all Ukrainians and even those-- Again, there's these two churches. One is this independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Of course, they've been absolutely supportive of the government, the soldiers, offering chaplaincies, offering, definitely, the kinds of social needs- trying to attend to the social needs of the people.

Then there's the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate. Again, they've cut ties, they've officially cut ties with the Moscow Patriarchate even though there's a cloud of suspicion. No one can accuse them of not helping their people and not being supportive of their people. It's just that because of their ties with the Moscow Patriarchate, there's still this cloud of suspicion over them, but yes, they have been providing all those particular kinds of needs.

Brian Lehrer: Let's take a phone call. Here's [unintelligible 00:19:15] in Lower Manhattan. [unintelligible 00:19:17], you're on WNYC. Thank you for calling in.

Caller 1: Wow, thanks so much for taking my call. Just a few words very quickly on this discussion. I am a former academic. I studied Russian literature and history very intensively and taught it in State University in Ohio, Ohio State University, actually. I just wanted to add that there's this idea of the Russian soul, which is one-third suffering, one-third tolerance, and one-third mysticism that a lot of Russians identify with. Myself, I'm Serbian, I'm Serbian Orthodox.

Though, I also wanted to bring up that the Russian Orthodox Church is like-- Kirill, he wears a Rolex. There are so many photographs of different church leaders who are blessing nuclear submarines and nuclear warheads. There's this idea [chuckles] that the church supports the state and the state supports the church, regardless of the agenda that the state is carrying on; in this case, obviously war against their cousins. I just wanted to throw that in there and see what our expert- how they might react to it.

Brian Lehrer: Gee, has Justice Alito studied that-- Nevermind. Professor?

Professor Papanikolaou: Yes. Look, religions are complicated and very ambiguous- I would say the word ambiguous realities. As with throughout Christianity, the institutional structures of the church never quite always lived up to the kinds of ideals that they preach. One could say that in our country, our government has never quite lived up to the democratic-- Martin Luther King's famous statement that all we want is for America to be consistent with what it says on paper.

To see those kinds of things within the institutional edifice, among its leaders, Rolexes, Mercedes, things like that, is unfortunate, tragic, but it's not necessarily surprising. The bottom line is that most of the institutional Orthodox Churches, after the communist situation, have really fought hard to again, regain their status within those particular communities and societies. As a result, they have made unfortunate compromises with various governments.

I think the one thing that the Orthodox Churches suffer under is what's called religious nationalism. That's something that we-- Ethnic or religious identities are fluid and they get elided. Americans had a hard time understanding that until recently. Because right now, we're going through our own manifestation and struggle with something called Christian nationalism. That's always been an endemic problem to the Orthodox Church, and the Russians have fallen prey to it.

Brian Lehrer: By the way, if the numbers you gave me are sitting in my brain accurately, something like 90% or more of the Ukrainian population would be Christian of one sort or another. How do they elect a Jewish president, Zelenskyy?

Professor Papanikolaou: Yes. Well, because again, I think-- Well, first of all, let me say that I know Orthodox Christians-- This is a line coming from certain more conservative angles, let's say, even popularized on certain TV networks, that there's, again, this conspiracy theory that the American government put Zelenskyy in, because how would an Orthodox Christian population elect a Jew? That's out there. Of course, obviously, I know you didn't mean it in that way, but that's out there as a conspiracy theory.

Look, I just think the Ukrainian society is-- One of the things that people don't realize, even though it is predominantly Christian, it is also a fairly religiously plural society. They have an all-Ukrainian religious council. There is a great deal of cooperation amongst Jews, Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox. I just think that the Ukrainians in their minds when they elected Zelenskyy at that particular point were just sick of the government, quite honestly, and sick of the previous government. I think that they just simply wanted someone to lead the country politically. I don't really think religion really played a role in the way they thought about their government and what they needed from their government, which is a good sign, I guess.

Brian Lehrer: Well, listeners, that's our conversation for this day, after Orthodox Easter, on the role of the Orthodox Church, complicated in the ways we've been hearing, in the war in Ukraine. We thank our guest, Aristotle Papanikolaou, who holds the Archbishop Demetrios Chair in Orthodox Theology and Culture at Fordham, and is co-founding director of the Orthodox Christian Studies Center there.

Thank you so much. This has been really fascinating. I appreciate all you know.

Professor Papanikolaou: You're welcome.

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