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Brian Lehrer: It's The Brian Lehrer Show on WNYC. Good morning, everyone. Well, as you've been hearing on the BBC, at least the US And Iran have pulled back from the mutually-assured destruction threats that both sides were issuing over the weekend, about attacking civilian, energy, and water infrastructure all over the region. At least there's that. Of course, that could be a decoy on Trump's part. I don't know if they said that on the BBC, like hoping Iran will let its guard down after being given this five-day delay in the threat and then the US will go in harder. We've seen that kind of thing before, haven't we? If we take Trump's written statement this morning at its word, and I'll say it again, he said, "The US and Iran have had over the last two days very good and productive conversations regarding a complete and total resolution of our hostilities in the Middle East." If we take that at its word, I think we have an excellent guest to discuss what might be in productive conversations to end the war.

Nate Swanson was a US negotiator with Iran last year for the Trump administration. Before that, he was director for Iran issues at the National Security Council in the Biden administration. He's got that bipartisan cred, including negotiating with Iran for Trump, though we should say he was fired by Trump in the end. Now he's Director of the Iran Strategy Project at the think tank, the Atlantic Council, and he has an article in Foreign Affairs called How America's War on Iran Backfired. Tehran Will Now Set the Terms for Peace. Nate, we appreciate your time with these latest very high stakes developments. Welcome to WNYC.

Nate Swanson: Thank you for having me.

Brian Lehrer: Would you give our listeners a little more background on you first? What kinds of negotiations were you involved with for the Trump administration with Iran last year? What was each side trying to achieve when you were there?

Nate Swanson: Sure. I'm a career civil servant from about 2007 to 2025, almost all of it on Iran, which was questionable life choices, but that's how it worked out. I spent the last couple of years of the Biden administration at the White House as the Iran director, and then I came back to State at the change of administration, which was my home agency. I figured that was it for my Iran career.

About a month into the administration, I got a call saying, "Hey, would you like to work with the negotiations team?" I said, "Sure." I did that through the spring of 2025, and I can talk more about that if that's of interest.

I don't want to overplay my role. I was really as a top down kind of a Steve Witkoff, President Trump led initiative, of course, unique to this administration, but then I left in the summer of 2025 under Laura-Loomer-like circumstances. That's the background.

Brian Lehrer: Laura Loomer, the conspiracy theorist influencer. The New Yorker, if I remember correctly, has also called her Trump's loyalty enforcer. She thought you were disloyal to Trump. Do you want to give us a very short version of that?

Nate Swanson: Yes. Solely because I was in the Biden NSC.

Brian Lehrer: What were you negotiating? What was Trump and the team that included you trying to negotiate with Iran last year? Obviously, that didn't work out from one side or the other or both, since we wound up at war.

Nate Swanson: Right. I actually do think it was a good faith effort. I think the Trump administration entered with the ability to do whatever they wanted. I think they had a relatively weak Iran, and they had an opportunity for diplomacy or more pressure like he did in Trump 1. They were all on table, but I do think there was this relatively serious initiative put forward by Steve Witkoff and the administration.

I think that the terms changed a little bit, but fundamentally it was somewhat similar to what was done during the Obama era, JCPOA. It was significant nuclear constraints on significant constraints on Iran's nuclear program in return for sanctions relief.

There was five meetings that happened in the spring of 2025. I was involved in some, not all, and some progress was made. I think there's a lot more attention in the press that said a deal was imminent. That was never the case. We were never that close, but it was professional conversation. At some point though, both the President and Israel ran out of patience and they went to the 12-day war in June instead, so that ran out.

Brian Lehrer: What do you think the deal breakers were on either side or any side that led to ultimately the US and Israel deciding that war was their best option?

Nate Swanson: Two things. From the US perspective, I think we were trying to find out what our bottom lines were. I think Trump was very conscious of the fact that he pulled out of the Iran deal, that Obama made the JCPOA. He knew the deal had to look different and frankly be better than what Obama signed on to in 2015, which was not easy. It took several rounds to lock in a position, but he decided that ultimately he supported a no-enrichment policy for Iran, which means they'd have to fully give up their nuclear program, which is reasonable from a US perspective. There's no reason for Iran to have this program. There's alternatives, but it was never going to happen.

Then I think from Iran's perspective, they were totally beholden to the framework and the details of the deal they made in 2015. It was basically the same people who negotiated then or still around now. They basically could not adjust. They could not meet Trump's unique style. I think he wanted to be personally involved in this. They would not do that. I think that was a mistake on Iran's part and doomed the whole process to failure that neither could really adjust to the other.

Brian Lehrer: Listeners, if you're just joining us, my guest is Nate Swanson, former US Iran negotiator. He has an article in Foreign Affairs called How America's War on Iran Backfired. Tehran Will Now Set the Terms for Peace. If you have any comments or questions specifically on this track, really, that we're on, which is about negotiating with Iran back on the table now after Trump's post this morning that they've had over the last two days, "very good and productive conversations regarding a complete and total resolution of our hostilities in the Middle east."

About negotiating with Iran, 212-433 WNYC, 212-433-9692. You can call or text. We'll also get into his analysis of where the war is militarily, which is also in his article.

Now, Nate, to the present, your article came out before Trump's 48 hour ultimatum Saturday night and Iran's threats in response, and now this pulling back from the brink of either side attacking power plants and water supplies. Did any of this surprise you? Did it fit into a bigger picture of this war that you described in your piece or anything like that? [silence] Nate, you there? We lost Nate.

All right. Maybe I'll read from the article a little bit while we're trying to get Nate back here. Again, it's called How America's War on Iran Backfired and Tehran Will Now Set the Terms for Peace. He wrote, and this was late last week, "Trump likely wants to declare victory soon. The Iranian military has been severely degraded. Israel may be running low on missile interceptors, and keeping global markets stable will require reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has declared close to its enemies, but he cannot force surrender on a government that refuses it.

Even after the heavy damage to Iran's military, the regime that Khamenei put in place has powerful incentives to pursue continued conflict, and it retains a variety of tools to sustain a war of attrition." This is why his article is subheaded Tehran Will Now Set the Terms for Peace. He writes, "The war is thus barreling toward an inflection point at which all the potential options are bad. To agree to a ceasefire, Tehran will almost certainly demand assurances that the United States will constrain future Israeli strikes on Iran."

He writes, "Trump retained substantial leverage over Netanyahu because of Israel's dependence on the US Military and its assistance, but it is still a huge ask." With that, we have Nate back on the phone. Sorry for whatever happened there with the connection. You're there, right?

Nate Swanson: No problem. Yes, I'm here.

Brian Lehrer: I'll restate my last question because I don't know if you heard it. It was that your article came out before Trump's 48-hour ultimatum Saturday night and Iran's threats in response, and now this \pulling back from the brink of either side attacking civilian power plants and water supplies. My question was, did any of this surprise you? Did it fit into a bigger picture of this war in any way that you describe in your piece or had in your mind?

Nate Swanson: It follows a pattern from the Trump administration's perspective from the beginning, which is this approach that Iran should capitulate. As long as the US puts more pressure on Iran, that Iran will, at some point, just have to give in and meet the President's demands. That's been a pattern, really, definitely this war, but even back to last year in the June war, with the 12-Day War. The President took these incredible actions and had no repercussions.

I think that's been his assumption the whole time that this was supposed to be a four-day war and he's expected, at different times, the regime collapse, total surrender, picking the Supreme Leader, all these different iterations which aren't going to happen. Maximalist threats have been the US MO on this and that hasn't changed. Iran, for their part, they believe this is an existential threat and probably correctly and feels like they need to take the most aggressive actions possible. That's what we're seeing.

The idea of striking a civilian energy program is extremely concerning on multiple fronts, and I think Iran threatening to retaliate in kind, including hitting desalinization plants in the Gulf would just really mean a really stark escalation on both sides. We're entering to new territory. I think it's good, hopefully, that both sides are seeking an off ramp at this point, because anything that goes on from here is diminishing returns really for both sides. I'm not 100% sure we'll be able to get a ceasefire out of this, but I think it is in both-sides' interest to wrap this up.

Brian Lehrer: Listener texts, "Trump lying today to calm markets. There are no negotiations." Do you think that's true? That's a listener speculation but do you think that might be true?

Nate Swanson: I think part of the messaging is directly aimed at the market. I think that part is accurate. There's been a number of messages focused on the market. I do think the longer this goes on, the worse it gets for the global economy, the worse it gets for the US economy, for the American taxpayer. I do think there's probably a strong incentive on the US side to actually seek an off ramp right now.

The same applies to Iran as well, even though they're denying it publicly, that they're at their maximum leverage point here and anything that goes on from here is diminishing returns. I tend to think it's genuine on both sides and hopefully wrap this up, but I can't say for sure. Look, the alternative is that we have more military on the way to the region. It's possible this is just a delay or a head fake to buy more time for those people to arrive. I suppose that's possible, but I hope that's not the case.

Brian Lehrer: For you, as someone who was involved with Trump administration negotiations with Iran, to the post that says they've had productive conversations regarding a resolution, what could be a negotiated resolution to stop the fighting?

Nate Swanson: It depends who you ask. From the US side, the clear number one priority now is the free flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has effectively stymied. That's a clear objective from the US side, and I think that is probably attainable.

I think Iran wants two things and, and we'll come back to what this means for the US in a second. They want, first and foremost, some kind of guarantee that this won't be a war that happens every six months. I think that this is the lesson they learned from the last June strike which was they sought a quick off ramp and the US and Israel were back at it again eight months later. They don't want to do this again. They don't want to fight tomorrow's war in six months. They'd rather do it now for a longer period of time. They're looking for something that makes this an enforceable ceasefire or just some kind of guarantee that it won't happen again. That's not easy.

Brian Lehrer: Go ahead.

Nate Swanson: Go ahead. I think the second thing they're wanting one is some kind of, in their words, financial compensation. What we saw on Friday the Trump administration unsanctioning Iranian vessels on the water for the first time that really symbolically quite important. The first time Iran's been able to sell or have the US buy oil since 1995. That's not even something the JCPOA allowed. Symbolically quite important and quite significant. I think Iran is hoping for some kind of continuation of this as well. That's what Iran wants. I don't know exactly what the US wants beyond the Strait of Hormuz, but I imagine there's other things they want as well.

Brian Lehrer: I've heard something about Iran downgrading the enrichment level of some of its existing uranium as something that might be in negotiations that the US could portray as a victory. Does that sound plausible to you?

Nate Swanson: Prior to the war, there was three rounds of negotiations between the US and Iran. What Iran put on the table was taking their stockpile of highly enriched uranium, it's enriched to 60%, so close to weapons grade, and they were offering to basically down-blend it to restart enrichment and move it to a lower level. That's basically put on the table. It's a significant but short term benefit, and I think the US should have good questions about whether that's all of the HEU that Iran's offering, but that was essentially the deal that was on the table, as I understand it, prior to the war. It's certainly conceivable something like that will be in play again.

Brian Lehrer: Another listener texts, "Trump clearly wants an off ramp. Israel does not. Regime collapse is useful-" meaning useful to Israel, "-and Iran hurts GCC adversaries too." Gulf Cooperation Council adversaries, the Gulf Arab states. The listener continues, "See today, Trump announced moratorium on hitting Iran's energy infrastructure while Israel is out bombing the infrastructure."

You wrote in your article that to agree to a ceasefire, Tehran will almost certainly demand assurances that the United States will constrain future Israeli strikes on Iran, and Iran could frame that as a triumph. Talk about the whole US-Israel dynamic here and how much they may be on the same or different tracks at this point.

Nate Swanson: That's what Iran wants. That's not what I'm advocating for. Look, I think we approach this, the US And Israel, with different objectives in mind. For Israel, this is really-- goes back to the October 7th attacks where they're no longer willing to take what had, one time, been perceived as these threats against Israel that you could live with. They feel like they can't live with anymore. Hamas and Hezbollah and Iran have said, "Death to Israel," and something along those lines. That's just no longer acceptable.

For Israel, this is understandably much more existential, and I do think they're seeking a regime collapse at some point. For the US, my contention is that I really think the US thought this would be easy, this would be like the strike last June, big US action, quick out, no repercussions, same thing with the Maduro operation in January, really same thing to when the US Trump 1 killed Qasem Soleimani, the IRGC Corps commander. There's really no repercussions.

My understanding here going in, the US thought this was-- they had a model that worked to be easy and then they would be out in three or four days, and obviously didn't happen. I thought it was a huge miscalculation of where Iran was, but that I think was the motivation. That's obviously very different than what Israel wants. I think there was shared motivation for getting in, but what the end state looks like is probably quite different at this point now.

Brian Lehrer: Here's another text from a listener who writes, "Didn't Trump brag about how he blew up everyone that he could possibly negotiate with? Who are we even talking to with regards to negotiations?" Here's the clip that I think the listener is referring to. This is very short. It was Trump on Friday night.

President Trump: We're having a hard time. We want to talk to them and there's nobody to talk to. We have nobody to talk to, and you know what, we like it that way.

Brian Lehrer: That sounds like just more bluster, but do you think there was any there there to that, that actually indicates that it's difficult to know who to negotiate with and that may be hampering actual negotiations?

Nate Swanson: Yes and no. Yes, in terms of many of the stalwarts of the Iranian regime, people the US Government knew well, the people that we were somewhat predictable, to an extent, are dead. That's just accurate. Not all of them, but it's a lot of them, including the supreme leader of course, and then the guy who's de facto head afterwards who's since been eliminated, Ali Larijani. These were guys that are well known and are somewhat predictable. A lot of them are dead. There's no doubt.

Now look, what we are seeing after the conflict though is there is a decentralized but relatively coherent governance. I don't know and I don't think most people, maybe even the US government, know who's actually making the final decisions in Iran right now, but there are decisions being made and I think you're seeing relatively stable command and control. I don't think Iran would freelance on this, and so if they're indicating they're willing to talk I think they'll send out someone they trust who will be an implementer of their policy.

I don't know who that person is right now or who those people are. It's probably more than one. I do think there are people who clearly are making decisions in Iran, and so if they're ready to talk, they'll talk.

Brian Lehrer: On the Israel track, they have this expanding offensive in and around Beirut taking an immense civilian casualty toll as they try to wipe out Iran-backed Hezbollah once and for all. There has been, of course, such an immense civilian casualty toll in Gaza as Israel tries to destroy Hamas. There's the big moral question of how much civilian death and destruction for how much additional security? There's also the military question of, will this actually end attacks into Israel from across the Lebanon border. Do you have a take?

Nate Swanson: Yes. It's a mixed take. On one hand, if you look at Israel's attacks on Lebanon in 2024, they were quite successful. They took out Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, and his senior leadership. It really did seem like it had an almost neutering effect on Hezbollah's ability to project power. That was my assumption coming into the war. I thought in some ways Israel was trying to repeat that same approach with Iran for this war.

We are seeing probably a stronger response from Hezbollah than I anticipated, which maybe leads me to question whether it was an effective a military campaign as possible. As we compare it to Hamas you can kill people, you can degrade abilities, but there's an ideology still there. It's hard to fully eradicate it. It's hard to have lasting military victories that don't have some kind of political settlement on the back end that walks in operational gains and strategic gains. It's hard to have a military-only victory here, and I'm skeptical that happens in any of those [unintelligible 00:23:07]

Brian Lehrer: Right. Ideology and also very deep sense of grievance on the part of the Palestinian people that might lead to new generations of revolts against Israel, whether it's called Hamas or something else. What's your take on Israel's military with respect to Iran itself? You wrote that Israel may be running low on missile interceptors, and that was before the missile strike yesterday, that was the worst of the war so far, that injured reported 180 people in Arad and southern Israel. What's your take on how much that was a fluke versus a sign of things to come, given what each side has left?

Nate Swanson: I don't know. There's been conflicting reports on Israel's capability in terms of missile interceptors. At one point Israel said they were running low, and then they denied it, so it's hard for me to say definitively what's true. A key variable in all this is there is just an actual numbers game for both sides in terms of munitions that Iran has available in terms of missiles and drones and interceptors on the back end for Israel and for the Gulf countries.

I don't have great insight into who has more. I think both sides have understandable desire to make it seem like they have more, and I don't know what's true or not. The risk for both sides is that you're on the losing end of those numbers, and when that happens, you have real problems. Both sides might not have total clarity into what the other has, so hopefully that pushes towards an end sooner than later.

Brian Lehrer: I should say you're not shy about criticizing Iran. In your article, you cite Iran's 70% inflation rate for food over the last year and its chronic electricity and water shortages, and you blame them in large part on Iran's foreign policy designed to counter US interests. Can you draw that link for us? How had Iran's foreign policy caused food prices to spike that much domestically?

Nate Swanson: Sure. Islamic Republic's been around for 47 years now at this point, or almost 47. Basically the hallmark of the regime, one of them has been this counter-America, counter-Israel policy. That meant arming proxies, developing a nuclear program, and over time, you had very significant sanctions put in place by the US by Europe, by others that have basically tried to use those tools as leverage to get Iran to change their foreign policy. It's just had a, over time, crippling effect on the Iranian ability to provide for their own people.

You cited the stats. It's 75% food increases over the last year. It's inflation over 40% the last six. The rial, the Iranian currency, at the time of the revolution, it was 70 rials to $1. I think it's something like 1.3 million rials to the dollar now, so just total devaluation of the currency. These are a direct result of their foreign policy. The hope was that when the supreme leader died, Ali Khamenei, that a future leader would have to look at Iran's decision making, how they interacted with the US, how they interacted with the region, including Israel, and say, "Hey, this is not the right path forward for me."

The irony of this situation, unfortunately, is we are delaying that decision at best, if not for years, potentially decades, and we're empowering the most hardline elements in Iran who are not going to look critically at that question and instead going to focus on security. The hope in all this is at some point some will be pragmatic enough to change their approach and say, "Hey, wait, I want my country to succeed. We need to actually change our foreign policy," but I don't think it's going to happen in the short term.

Brian Lehrer: To conclude, does that relate to the title of your article, How America's War on Iran Backfired?

Nate Swanson: Yes, it does. Iran was probably, in my estimation, at its lowest point in January. In January, the Iranian regime went out and killed thousands, potentially tens of thousands of their own people who were protesting just for better life, essentially. My hope was at that point you have this Iran that was weakened militarily, was weakened domestically, economically, and a supreme leader who had cancer and was 86 and would hopefully die at some point, and that when he died, there is the opportunity for a new future, a new decision making. I just, unfortunately, think we might be further away from that now. I do think the war has backfired a little bit.

Brian Lehrer: Nate Swanson was a US negotiator with Iran last summer for the Trump administration. Before that, he was Director for Iran issues at the National Security Council in the Biden administration. He's now Director of the Iran Strategy Project at the think tank the Atlantic Council. His article in Foreign Affairs is called How America's War on Iran Backfired. Tehran Will Now Set the Terms for Peace. Thank you for joining us.

Nate Swanson: Thank you.

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