Brian Lehrer: It's The Brian Lehrer Show on WNYC. Good morning, everyone. We are honored to have Christiane Amanpour joining us today to talk about issues in, and some historical context for the war with Iran. Christiane holds the joint positions of CNN's chief international anchor and PBS host, as her show, Amanpour, airs first on CNN International, and then also on PBS as Amanpour & Company, which is where many of you probably see it in the United States. In New York, for example, that's 4:00 PM, and midnight on Channel 13.

As some of you know, Christiane, in her own life, has also had feet in multiple worlds, growing up in both Iran and the UK, adding to the perspective, of course, that she can bring to world events like these in her 40-plus years now with CNN. Christiane, we always appreciate it when you take some time from your own very demanding schedule to come on with us. Welcome back to WNYC.

Christiane Amanpour: My pleasure, Brian.

Brian Lehrer: I wonder if we could take advantage of your deep knowledge by asking you to help listeners know some of the historical context, which I think doesn't get talked about enough since the beginning of the war. Maybe start the clock in 1953, when Iran had an elected leader named Mohammad Mosaddegh, who the United States helped overthrow that year, 1953, and reinstall the Shah of Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi. Why did the United States care who ran Iran at that time and want to see Mosaddegh out?

Christiane Amanpour: Well, because there were competing objectives. The US CIA did this with the British MI6, their foreign intelligence service here. For the British, it was trying to get a reverse of Mosaddegh's nationalization of the Iranian oil company and the Iranian oil production and export, et cetera. For the USA, I don't know how much it was to do with oil, but it was most definitely to do with worrying that Mosaddegh might be played as a pawn by then Soviet Union. For the United States, Iran was, as fatefully, Jimmy Carter, as president, said in 1977 on the eve of the revolution, he came to Iran, and he praised it as being an island of stability in the Middle East.

That goes to show that for decades and decades, the US, and particularly Kissinger and Nixon during their time, bolstered Iran, bolstered the Shah, gave them lots of weapons and lots of equipment as their sort of bulwark against the Soviet Union, whose territory bordered Iran, and the Soviets were always trying to figure out a warm-water port which is the Persian Gulf, and they'd always threatened Iran in that way. The US and the non-communist world were very keen to keep Iran onside, and therefore really brought the Shah in very, very close, a big, big close hug for decades, as I say, giving him all the military and the political cover and all that to keep him onside.

Unfortunately, though, for the US and for everybody, the 1953 coup, which was the first actually engineered by the United States in the post war era, and then, obviously, it went on to others in Congo and Latin America,-

Brian Lehrer: Latin America, yes.

Christiane Amanpour: -South America. Yes. That was a very, very dramatic moment in US Iranian relations, which, frankly, they've never recovered from, because even though the Shah came back 20 odd years later, or just more than that, the Iranians who cited that coup as part of a reason to distrust America, and that is then what led to the taking of one of the reasons why the students illegally took the US embassy captive, many, many US diplomats captive in the embassy in Tehran, and held them hostage for 444 days.

Brian Lehrer: In 1979, when the Islamic revolution took place, and those American hostages were taken at the embassy, the Shah was toppled, and Ayatollah Khomeini became the supreme leader. How popular was that, in your understanding of 1979 history, among the Iranian people? I don't mean the hostage-taking, but the revolution. Who became in charge, and what were the main factions among the public?

Christiane Amanpour: Well, it was popular. That's why there was the revolution. People did, in fact, including people who had been very supportive of the Shah, but many intellectuals, many, not only the educated, and the pro-Western, and the women, and many, many others believe that there should also be, not just prosperity for a certain limited group of Iranians, but there needs to be democracy. The Shah's regime was not democratic. He did empower women, I will say, and that was a big, big issue. He created Iran's first-ever Ministry of Women Affairs. He nominated and made a woman the head of that.

Under the Shah, many, many rights for women were then formalized under the law, rights that they didn't have before, and rights that the ayatollahs immediately took away when they came in, having promised women and all the others a democratic Iran. Just imagine these ayatollahs with turbans and beards actually convinced a huge population in Iran, not just the Shiite faithful, not just the working class, but even the upper classes, and convinced the British government at the time. Obviously, the Americans kind of believed it, and so did the French. They believed that this guy who said he was going to bring democracy to Iran was going to do that.

Well, within very, very short order of toppling the Shah, which, as I say, was popular at the time because people rose up against him, then Ayatollah Khomeini basically cracked down on women first. He closed down the Ministry of Information, or rather, of Women's Affairs. He made women go back under the veil, the chador, the hijab, and denied a lot of progress under the law that was made for Iranian women.

It's a bait and switch, as many historians say, from the perspective of the Islamic revolution that is continuing today, but not pretending to be democratic. Rather, it's a theocracy, it's autocratic, it's tyrannical in many, many aspects of it. The most recent visualization of that was the bloody crackdown on protesters in January.

Brian Lehrer: Listeners, we can take some texts and phone calls for Christiane Amanpour, CNN's chief international anchor and host of Amanpour & Company on PBS. Anything about the war, or some of the historical context that we're discussing, or if you're a longtime Amanpour watcher, you can just fanboy or fangirl out a little with her, or anything else relevant. 212-433-WNYC, call or text, 212-433-9692, for Christiane Amanpour. We have her until 10:30 this morning.

Christiane, Americans would tend to think of Iran under the ayatollahs as domestically a strict theocracy, as you were just describing a little of, and internationally, as an aggressive state, certainly hostile to Israel, but also to the West, "death to America," et cetera, and often, to many of the Gulf Arab states. Is there a way you can describe the main big picture of their international goals over these 47 years?

Christiane Amanpour: Well, from the beginning, in 1979, they really believed they were going to export their Shiite Islamic republic revolution around the Islamic world. It didn't work, not least because they are in a minority in the Islamic world. The Sunnis make up most of the world's Muslims, but they did keep looking for areas that they could bring on side and help them in the projection of their A, what they called, axis of resistance to both Israel's conduct against the Palestinians and to the United States. They called the United States the Great Satan. Actually, they called Britain the Little Satan. They mapped out this part and this role for themselves internationally as so-called axis of resistance.

Well, as you've seen, since October 7th, most specifically, that aim, that strategy, has been completely dashed because of support for Hamas, support for Hezbollah, what they did in Syria, supporting the dictator Bashar al-Assad, and on and on, and obviously, the Houthis in Yemen. Israel and the United States have been pushing Iran back in a very violent and warlike way, to the point that Iran is now much, much weakened.

Therefore, they thought that this time, they might be able to come in and take advantage of Iran's weak state, which is a fact, to either try to topple the regime. That was one of their first articulated goals, both Israel and the United States, but also, most definitely, to try to make sure that they would never have the ability to make a nuclear weapon. This is something that the West and Israel have wanted to make sure for all the decades since Iran has had a nuclear program. There was a nuclear deal, as you remember, hammered out and negotiated over two years by the Obama administration with the Iranian government, the Iranian Revolutionary Government.

That actually worked, but that was never satisfactory for Israel. Trump, under pressure or advice from Israel, pulled out. Even the limited arms control agreement, that was a first-ever around the nuclear issue, Trump pulled out of it. Israel said, "Well, it was Benjamin Netanyahu. We need to do much more against Iran." That's for the international. For the domestic, there have been periods of lessening brutality and heightened brutality. In some instances, protests on the streets, which are frequent. The Iranian people have been demanding a better, freer, affordable life, able to travel, not to be international pariahs because of their government.

They've been rising up many, many times, at least for the last 20, 25 years. I've covered a lot of it, but each and every time, they have been brutally suppressed. However, it doesn't mean to say they've stayed at home. Each and every time, they come out. We don't always hear about it in the West, but they're very, very active in trying to get their own freedom and trying to get their rights. Now, unfortunately, for the Iranian people, their human rights and their democratic rights have never been on the agenda of the international community.

Whenever the United States, or Britain, or Europe, or other people talk about trying to change the behavior or the regime in Iran, they never, ever, ever put the support for the Iranian people on the front burner, or even somewhere down in the agenda. It's sometimes lip service, but it's never been a point of policy. That's an issue. That's a problem. Whereas the United States has been their holy grail, in terms of people, have hoped that the United States would help them. Certainly, they hoped that it might happen in the Green Revolution in 2009, it didn't.

They hoped that it would happen this time around because of the words of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, who many, many times over these protests said, "Come out. We will help you seize your institutions. Help is on the way." Netanyahu in Israel said similar things. "Come out, topple this government. You are the proud, noble people of Iran." That help never came. Now we're sitting here in now nearly two weeks of this war, and there has been less and less talk about the rights and the future of the Iranian people.

As the US tries to figure out what its endgame is and what its actual objectives are, which are somewhat different to Israel's, the Iranian people face being slung under the bus again, particularly as President Trump has said and Defense Secretary Hegseth said, "This is not about regime change." Trump said, "We don't care about the democracy in Iran. That's not our main aim," et cetera, et cetera. Trump has also said that they are willing to work with, even potentially, somebody on the inside who might even be a religious leader. There's a lot of confused messaging, and it's getting worse, the epithets that are being thrown at, presumably, they mean the regime, but they say Iran.

Trump recently said aboard Air Force One, Iranians are the most evil people in the world. Hegseth today called them barbaric savages. Again, he may be talking about the regime, but it's the way they have basically treated the Iranian people for decades and decades.

Brian Lehrer: Let me take a history caller question for you, and then I'm going to relate it to the present, because one thing I was going to ask you anyway, that many, many Americans may be confused about is why Iran is attacking Gulf Arab nations, not just Israel or US installations, particularly in the region, and why they have such a rivalry with Saudi Arabia in particular. I'm going to let David in Inwood, Manhattan, start to frame this up. David, you're on WNYC with Christiane Amanpour. Hi.

David: Good morning. Big fan of the show, and thank you, Christiane, for coming on board this great, great show. Can you talk a little bit about the cause of the Iranian-Iraqi war in the '80s, which caused many years of hardship? What was the outcome of it at the end, after eight years of war?

Brian Lehrer: The Iran-Iraq war, most of the 1980s. That was when the US was for Saddam Hussein, before they were against them, [chuckles] if you think that's an accurate description. I know the US considered both of those countries enemies of the US to some degree, but it relates to the larger question that I was going to ask about why there's so much rivalry between Iran and Arab states in the area, not just between Iran and US interests or Israel.

Christiane Amanpour: Well, I would say that the caller's question is incredibly valid and goes to what you're seeing coming out of the Iranian regime right now. In other words, the Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq at the time, thought Iran was weak because it was immediately, let's say, a year after the revolution, and they were still consolidating. He thought he could-- again, his long-term dream was to battle Iran, with whom Iraq faced fierce competition over what they called the Shatt al-Arab waterway that leads into the Straits of Hormuz, into the Persian Gulf, and is the key outlet for exporting oil. There was big competition over that.

There had been a deal between the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein, and it was going fairly professionally, insofar as various countries' relations go over this huge economic output. Then when the Ayatollah came in, I think, and it's historically correct, that Saddam thought he could take it all over and launched an invasion in September of 1980 against Iran, thinking that it would happen quickly, and they would be able to take over quickly. Instead, it took eight years. It didn't end until very deep into 1988, and it ended in negotiation and essentially a stalemate.

What it really did was what you're seeing now. It was the first actual battle, existential battle that the Islamic republic faced. Therefore, it put all its natural and human resources, I mean, its whole population was thrown at this war. It was a wartime population, a wartime endeavor, a wartime economy. Most importantly, for today, might give you an idea of the fervor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and the Basij today. The Basij is essentially a volunteer foot soldiers of the Revolutionary Guard and the army. Back in 1980, Iran essentially conscripted tens of thousands of young boys. We're talking teenagers, put red bands around their heads emblazoned with the Allahu Akbar, God is great, and all of that.

They might have even been green bands. Anyway, whatever, sent them into the minefields that Saddam and others had laid around the borders. They were the advance mine crews, anti-demining crews. Humans were sent into that slaughter. In the end, Iran, as I said, battled to a stalemate and did not lose, but it shows you that even that kind of-- I mean, I don't know, it's just a horrendous thing to do, that they did it, and that fervor may be amongst diminishing amounts of people, but that fervor is the fervor that fuels the Basij today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, and the whole system. It is a system based on repelling foreign invasion, international pressure, et cetera.

While you're seeing the Revolutionary Guard take the lead in the public Iranian commentary and action during this war, even though US and Israel had hoped that by killing off Ayatollah Khamenei and his top layer at the very beginning, in the first hours, the first strike, that would cause the system to wobble, and shudder, and lose faith, and that would be the opportunity they hoped, the US and Israel and the opposition, hoped that that would be the opportunity to show the rest of the regime that they needed to start defecting, put down their arms, go to the other side, surrender, et cetera, and that would lead to regime change. So far, that hasn't happened, but that was certainly the thinking at the beginning.

Brian Lehrer: I've seen some analysis that says Iran may be making a tactical or strategic error by attacking the Gulf states because they might have been with Iran to some degree in opposing US military intervention in the region, and pressured the US to stop quickly, but that Iran's attacks are making the Gulf states feel betrayed and they can't trust Iran, and so throwing the Gulf states into the United States camp of really wanting to destroy Iran's military as much as possible. Does that analysis ring true to you at all?

Christiane Amanpour: I'm sorry, I lost my train of thought.

Brian Lehrer: No, it's okay.

Christiane Amanpour: I forgot to answer that. Here's the thing. I asked the most senior Saudi official who I've been speaking to recently, and that's the former head of their spy agency, their CIA, and he was ambassador to the US and to the UK, so he's very, very well-versed. He also was Saudi Arabia's lead on the Taliban and other such things when they faced this terrible threat, like everybody did from Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, et cetera. Just to say, he's incredibly plugged in and very well-versed.

Well, the first thing he said to me was that he is surprised that the US is surprised or that anybody is surprised by Iran's response. Because he said that Iran, including the foreign minister and other Iranian regime officials, had gone over and again to the capitals in the Gulf states and explained to them, "Please don't allow the US to attack us from your bases, from your areas where you all have these US bases, and you have this relationship with the United States. Here's our plan of retaliation."

They said, "First, we will attack Israel in retaliation. Second, we will attack US bases in your countries, in your states, in retaliation. Third, we will attack other economic, tourism, civilian, those kind of targets which they've been striking." This was very, very well telegraphed by Iran, according to the Saudi former spy chief. We also heard about it in the press at the time before the war. Those leaders, in turn, implored the United States, even though they do not like Iran, they are not Iran allies. They have had bad relations with Iran for many, many years, not least because they don't want an Islamic republic and Islamic revolutions in their Gulf states either.

That is why they tried to get the US not to do this military intervention. They are very angry now about what happened, the retaliation by Iran, which happened so quickly. All those three points of escalation happened very quickly because of the force of the US-Israel attacks on Iran, and because it's now an existential battle for the Iranians. Look, I mean, war has unintended consequences, and it's really appalling. It looks like the UAE struck a desalination plant in Iran. If that starts a war against desalination plants in the region, IE, in the Gulf states as well, including Saudi Arabia, that is a catastrophe for human life, right?

That is really a catastrophe, because they exist on desalination in all these places where they have limited water because of climate change, and that they are surrounded by salty water. This is a catastrophe. Then the other unintended consequence, the United States is believed to have been responsible for the killing of those schoolgirls in the southern region, Minab, in that school, according to very meticulous investigations by New York Times and others. They believe that the US is the most likely group who did that because they were, and they say, operating in that area on that first day. The US says that it is investigating. There's no evidence to suggest, as Trump has said, without any evidence, that I don't know, Iran did it to themselves.

Brian Lehrer: Listener texts, "It's hilarious. You," meaning, I think this is the broad you, anybody in the media, "claim democracy is an issue for the West in Iran, given the West's alliance with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two paragons of democracy," the listener writes sarcastically. Of course, Trump has not been supporting the idea of democracy around the world, far from it. I think it's fair to say he's been happy to build an alliance of autocracy-leaning strong men who support each other. Bolsonaro, Putin, Modi, Orban in Hungary, Bukele and El Salvador. We're seeing it now in Venezuela, where Maduro's vice president remains in charge as long as she's more friendly to US interests.

Let's say it's just the military goals, and then the US and Israel stop the campaign, what happens then to the Iranian people? To set this up, and I know you touched on this before, now I'm going to play the clip. This is President Trump in his video announcing the war 10 days ago. 30 seconds.

President Donald Trump: For many years, you have asked for America's help, but you never got it. No president was willing to do what I am willing to do tonight. Now you have a president who is giving you what you want, so let's see how you respond. America is backing you with overwhelming strength and devastating force. Now is the time to seize control of your destiny and to unleash the prosperous and glorious future that is close within your reach. This is the moment for action. Do not let it pass.

Brian Lehrer: I'm curious, Christiane, how you felt or what you thought when you first heard that clip 10 days ago, and what you think about it now.

Christiane Amanpour: Well, very conflicted, like many in the diaspora, and many, I guess, inside Iran as well, because it is true, the Iranians have looked to the US and to the outside to try to help them out of this nightmare of a ruthless regime, which was again, as they say, on full display in the bloody crackdown of the protests of the first week of January. Even then, President Trump had called them out onto the streets. "Seize your institutions, take names. Help is on the way." Help was not on the way. Help was not delivered anyway.

Now, help, apparently, is there. All the military assets, all the hardware, the verbal commitments or statements from the White House, from Israel, et cetera, but these statements change on a regular basis. The latest is that it is not about the Iranian people. It is not about democracy. It is only about-- now they've shifted to a goal that, as I said, they kicked out the idea of regime change very early on, but they've shifted to making sure Iran can never have a nuclear program. We were told the whole thing was obliterated in the 12-Day War, so in any event, destroy their navy. They don't actually have much of a navy, and make sure they don't have the ability to launch or produce missiles.

It's a narrower goal, but importantly, importantly, and this is correct, what the questioner said, no, they have not cared about democracy for the people of the Muslim Middle East. That's very, very clear. We were told that the idea of going into Iraq was about bringing democracy. Now, it is true that Iraq is a lot freer 25 years later and more democratic than it was under Saddam Hussein by a long way. However, it took 25 years, trillions of dollars, civil war, ISIS, Al Qaeda. I mean, a complete and utter meltdown. What people in Iran are afraid of is if the military goals are whatever, and Trump and Netanyahu declare victory and leave, what happens to them? What happens to the people who had come out before or who want to change?

To this point, I had Senator Chris Murphy on my program a week or so ago, the first time the senators were briefed several days into the war by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Many of them came out and said that they were pretty stunned because they asked that same question that you've just asked. What happens if people of Iran take up the call to change their regime after this military phase of this conflict, and those people are still in charge? What happens if the IRGC, the Islamic government, is still in charge? They look pretty entrenched right now. What happens if they're still-- What is your plan, Secretary of State, to protect and preserve a democratic uprising inside Iran?

They said they came out with no answers. There were no answers. This is very, very dangerous territory for the people of Iran, I would say, right now. As I say, again, there are many in the diaspora, and even many in Iran right now, at least some of those who we're hearing from, who hope that this bombing campaign will lead to their deliverance, but from here to there, right now, it doesn't look clear.

Brian Lehrer: I know you got to go in two minutes. Let me touch one separate but related thing. In 2023, a women's rights activist in Iran, Narges Mohammadi, won the Nobel Peace Prize. She remains imprisoned in Iran. So little publicity about this in the United States. I saw that you contributed to a CNN story just last month about the Nobel Committee alleging that Mohammadi has been assaulted in prison. I want to play a short clip from a video Mohammadi made with Amnesty International. This clip is from 2024, just before her latest imprisonment begins.

Narges Mohammadi: I want to express my deepest gratitude to every Amnesty officer across all countries, especially Amnesty Iran, and most of all, to you, Ms. Agnes Callamard. I have to say, for your relentless efforts, your work on Iran, on my case, on cases of other Iranian activists and Iranian political prisoners, on executions in Iran, and on ending gender apartheid has brought so much hope to me and others and my friends in prison.

Brian Lehrer: Christiane, can you characterize what she meant there by the term gender apartheid-

Christiane Amanpour: Yes, it's pretty self--

Brian Lehrer: -and just say what she means to Iran? 30 seconds.

Christiane Amanpour: It's pretty self-evident. There is a deeply misogynistic and often violent repression of women's rights in Iran, like across much of the Arab and Muslim world. She's in prison because of her incredibly brave and consistent, despite the attacks, physical and verbal, the psychological pressure she's under, she consistently sticks to her credentials as a leading dissident, a leading democracy activist, and a leading women's rights activist. She was furloughed for medical reasons, but right at the start of this war, she was brought back in again. She has been abused in prison. She's been, according to her family, according to the Nobel Committee, kicked and shoved and punched around.

Unfortunately, some in the opposition diaspora have cast aspersions on her, too. It's bizarre, but they believe that whoever's inside Iran should be calling for regime change and the return of Reza Pahlavi, which people might want, but you can't really do that from inside an Iranian prison. When you're actually walking the walk, talking the talk, and suffering for what you believe in, and the struggle you are leading on behalf of Iranian women. I've interviewed her, I've interviewed her children. I can only tell you that Iranian women are some of the most valiant, committed, intelligent, and empathetic political dissidents that I've ever come across in my whole life.

I believe that if they got their full rights, Iran would be the most incredible country because, unlike most of the other neighboring Arab Muslim states, Iranian women, despite the legal problems and despite all the other problems, have many more rights than any of the women in any of those US allies arrayed around the Gulf. This is an important paradox to remember.

Brian Lehrer: Christiane Amanpour, who holds the joint positions of CNN's chief international anchor and PBS host, as her show, Amanpour, airs first on CNN International, and then also on PBS as Amanpour & Company, which is where many of you probably see it in the United States. In New York, for example, that's 4:00 PM, and midnight on Channel 13. Christiane, we appreciate so much that you took some time for us today. Best to you.

Christiane Amanpour: Thank you so much. Thank you to your listeners, too.

Brian Lehrer: Brian Lehrer on WNYC. Much more to come.

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